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OVERSEAS CHINESE EDUCATION IN INDONESIA

Minority Group Schooling
in an Asian Context

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
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OVERSEAS CHINESE EDUCATION IN INDONESIA

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Minority Group Schooling In an Asian Context

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The author is grateful for the ideas and insights provided by these scholars. However, the interpretations and conclusions expressed in the study are her own, and do not necessarily represent either their views or those of any agencies of the U.S. Government.

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Preface

A system of education designed for a religious, racial, or ethnic minority group distinct from the greater society in which it functions is neither a recent innovation nor is it a phenomenon encountered only in one part of the world. It has existed in basically two forms: (1) that which is provided for by the dominant group, often to enforce separateness, as has been exemplified by racially segregated schools in some countries; and (2) that which is provided for by the minority group itself for the purpose of maintaining political and cultural cohesion and separateness within its own community. It is this second form which the overseas Chinese have established throughout Southeast Asia.)

These two types of separate minority education may be further differentiated on the basis of where the initiative for separateness arises. In the first type, a desire to maintain separate schools may or may not exist within the minority group; but separate education for the minority is desired by the dominant group as evidenced by its willingness to provide the needed financial support. The second case implies that separateness is desired by the subgroup, especially if other dominant group education is also available. It further implies that the subgroup has the economic ability to support separate educational facilities for its members.

[A third identifiable type of minority group education is a combination of the two basic types already mentioned, occurring when the dominant group provides separate education at the request of the subgroup. Examples include Communist Chinese provisions for vernacular education among tribal peoples of China's westernmost regions, or a colonial government's provisions for separate schools for different language groups within its territories.] Such efforts by the dominant group¹ often are temporary in nature, with the ultimate goal being to bring these groups into some form of unified educational system which may or may not feature actual integration of dominant and subgroup students in the same schools.

(The educational provisions for the Chinese minority in Indonesia

¹ As in the case of the colonial territories, "dominant" may mean dominance in power rather than in numbers.

reflect to some extent elements of all three types of separate minority education as herein described. Of greatest significance in explaining the situation which has emerged, however, is the role of the Chinese minority in striving for and establishing separate education for its children. The Chinese have been able to achieve this goal by virtue of their historically strong economic position in the Dutch East Indies and, until recently, in the Republic of Indonesia.

But the maintenance of Chinese schools, which served to intensify the separateness of the Chinese community, significantly affected the Indonesian Government's efforts to unify its territory and people. Thus these separate schools became a focal issue in the relations between the politically dominant Indonesian majority and the economically powerful Chinese minority. The background of this issue, and the sequence of events which brought it into prominence in recent years, constitute an instructive case study of the special problems of educational policy in a developing country which has a sizable and influential ethnic minority.

END

M. W. C.

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I. Historical Background of Chinese Separateness

Indonesia is one of the former colonies in Southeast Asia which received its independence in the wake of World War II. Prior to that time, it had been a colony of the Dutch, who were attracted to it as a source of valuable raw materials and as a stake in the Far East trade of the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries. Today, Indonesia, a nation of many islands, boasts the fifth largest population of any country in the world. Its more than 100 million people, primarily of Malay extraction, are unevenly distributed among these islands; almost two-thirds of its inhabitants live on the island of Java.

The signing of the Round Table Agreement of the Hague in December 1949, marked the conclusion of some 300 years of Dutch colonial rule in "the Indies." New national leaders found themselves responsible for the unification of a multitude of distinct linguistic, racial, and cultural groupings united in the main only by their common experience of Dutch colonial rule. Most of these people lacked any sense of identification with the geographical unit of Indonesia, possessing a regional identification only.¹ Furthermore, these citizens of a new nation were distributed among the many islands of an archipelago bridging the Asian continent and Australia over a distance of some 3,000 miles.

In order for the Indonesian leadership to realize the national goals embodied in *Pantja Sila*, or the "Five Principles,"² as delineated by Ir. Sukarno on June 1, 1945,³ many economic problems would have to be overcome. Implicit in overall national development planning was the need to secure financing for a program of national education, inasmuch as such a program was considered essential to the goals of

¹ G. William Skinner. "The Nature of Loyalties in Rural Indonesia." *Local, Ethnic and National Loyalties in Village Indonesia: A Symposium*. New York: Yale University Cultural Report Series, Southeast Asian Studies, 1959. p. 2.

² (1) Belief in God, (2) humanity, (3) social justice, (4) national consciousness, (5) sovereignty of the people.

³ Ir. Sukarno. *The Birth of Pantja Sila*. Washington: Embassy of Indonesia, Information Division, [n.d. p. 12-16.

creating representative government, and unifying cultural, linguistic, and regional differences into a spirit of national identification.

In this situation, it was of particular significance that local Chinese and some 100,000 Dutch nationals occupied the dominant economic position in Indonesia, exercising virtual monopoly over land holdings and industry in cities and rural areas, and control of the machinery for running such operations as well. In addition, virtually all of the retail trade in Indonesia was, as it had been under Dutch administration, in the hands of the Chinese.

The Role of the Chinese in the Colonial Era

Historical Chinese records tell of the first wave of Chinese migration into the Nanyang, as the area in and around the South China Sea is called, in the 7th century.¹ Coming primarily from the southern coastal provinces of China, these people tended to settle on the northern coast of Java.² By 1509, when the Portuguese preceded other European traders into Malacca and the Malay Peninsula, they found Chinese trade among the islands well established.³ The overseas Chinese had already set up trade routes to nearby countries, thus paving the way for the second wave of Chinese migrations which occurred in the 15th century.⁴ These trade routes were eventually brought under the spheres of influence of the technologically superior European powers.

When the Dutch East India Company extended its commercial and military activity into Central Java in the 17th century, it found Chinese merchants and traders in every important town.⁵ Although the Dutch East India Company considered the Indies primarily a source of raw materials, it learned at the outset that the Chinese community was valuable in providing a readily available marketing network for the distribution of European goods to the indigenous population.⁶ Further, the Company and, later, the Dutch Government⁷ utilized the Chinese in its system of administering economic control over the local people, since the Chinese had no ties with the

¹ A. M. Ta Chen. *Chinese Migrations With Special Reference to Labor Conditions*. Washington: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1923. p. 4.

² G. William Skinner. "The Chinese of Java," *Colloquium on Overseas Chinese*. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1958. p. 1.

³ Su-Ching Chen. *China and Southeast Asia*. Chungking: China Institute of Pacific Relations, 1945. p. 21.

⁴ Ta Chen, *loc. cit.*

⁵ Donald Willmott. *The Chinese of Semarang*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1960. p. 3.

⁶ M. J. Meijer. *The Chinese in Indonesia*. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. [n.d.]. p. 7.

⁷ The Dutch East India Company turned over its holdings in the Indies to the Netherlands Government in 1815 after a period of British control.

remaining centers of indigenous Javanese power and leadership. Thus the Dutch delegated powers of tax collections, administration of government monopolies, and collection of rents primarily to the Chinese.⁸

In line with the Dutch colonial policy of indirect rule, leading Chinese merchants were appointed to equivalents of military rank as the so-called "Captains of Chinese" in order to facilitate the administration of the Chinese community.⁹ However, this is not to say that the Chinese were given a free hand by the Dutch. On the contrary, grievances on the part of the Chinese continued throughout the Dutch colonial administration. Colonial administrative practices which included a separate judicial system applied to the Chinese, living and travel restrictions, and special economic privileges not accorded the indigenous people had the effect of estranging the Chinese population from the total society.

As a result of the new Dutch "ethical policy" applied to the treatment of native peoples toward the end of the 19th century, a very limited system of primary and some secondary education was made available for the indigenous Indies population. Despite Chinese requests for separate education for their children, however, the Dutch granted no such appeals until early in the 20th century.¹⁰

Meanwhile, after a brief period of British rule in the Indies (1811-16), the third wave of Chinese migration was being evidenced throughout Southeast Asia. With the development of mining and plantation agriculture in the Indies during the latter part of the 19th century, the importation of Chinese laborers throughout the Indies initiated the period of the "coolie trade" which would continue until 1930.¹¹ However, during the latter part of this period, the Dutch introduced legislation to prohibit the import of foreign labor in order to utilize the resources of the native populations. Since Chinese were not allowed to own land, they faced the alternative of returning home, as some did, or going into the only economic enterprise left available to them—work as "artisans, small tradesmen, and shopkeepers."¹² Inasmuch as this latest immigration had placed Chinese mainly in the "outer islands", they frequently stayed there, setting up business enterprises in the local towns and villages. Many remained there until Indonesian governmental decree and military enforcement expelled great numbers of Chinese from these rural communities in 1959 and 1960.¹³

⁸ Lea Williams. "Indonesia's Chinese Education Raffles." *Indonesie*. October 1956. p. 380.

⁹ Willmott. *The Chinese of Semarang*. loc. cit.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

¹¹ Brian Harrison. *Southeast Asia*. London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 1955. p. 223.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ "Ban on Alien Traders." *Asian Recorder*, Vol. V, December 19-25, 1959. p. 3065.

Growing Chinese Nationalism

Beginning in the 20th century, the reciprocal interest of overseas Chinese and mainland Chinese in one another, inspired by growing Chinese nationalism, was instrumental in causing the Dutch to drop some of their sanctions against the overseas Chinese. Events on the Chinese mainland were not going unnoticed by the Nanyang Chinese in the Indies or elsewhere. Spurred on by Japanese success in its venture against the heretofore all-powerful West in the Russo-Japanese War, Chinese nationalism was reaching a high pitch. Emboldened by mainland China's rising interest in their cause, the Indonesian Chinese pressed for removal of the Dutch sanctions against them, and with some success. By 1908, the Dutch established the Dutch-Chinese schools,¹⁴ but not before the Chinese had created their own extensive private educational facilities. By 1914, the *Politie Rol*, a separate judicial body for regulation of the Chinese community, was discontinued, although civil law as it applied to the Europeans was not extended to the Chinese until 1919.¹⁵ The hated "pass system," which had limited the freedom of Chinese movement, was abolished officially in that year, although it had fallen into disuse prior to that time.¹⁶

In the period which followed World War I, Dutch administration of affairs pertaining to the Chinese was still kept distinct from supervision of the indigenous peoples. Those responsible for this administration, however, are reported to have been highly respected by the overseas Chinese community,¹⁷ inasmuch as they were specialists who knew the classical literature of China. But as China was unified under the Nationalist Government in the late 1920's, Dutch apprehension grew regarding the role of the overseas Chinese as a possible threat to Dutch authority. During the 1930's, a Service for East Asiatic Affairs was created to deal with the Chinese. However, the Chinese regarded its officers as spies who were responsible for "closing down newspapers and schools, forbidding books, and ejecting teachers from the country who had been brave enough to voice their opinion."¹⁸ Unrest developed again in the Chinese community and quasi-political groups began to form.

¹⁴ Skinner, "The Chinese of Java," p. 3.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹⁶ Meljer, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 11-12.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

Period of the Japanese Occupation

With the coming of World War II, the Japanese occupation of the Indies produced a strongly unifying effect upon the divided Chinese community. Insofar as the Japanese were concerned, all Chinese, whether born in China or in the Indies, were Chinese. They closed all of the diverse Chinese organizations and set up the *Hua Ch'iao Tsung Hui*, through which all Chinese affairs were administered.¹⁹ While the Dutch-Chinese schools were closed in 1942, many of the Chinese schools continued under the Japanese and their enrollments greatly increased.²⁰ An additional effect of the Japanese occupation which had particular impact upon the younger Chinese, was the disintegration of traditional sources of leadership and power within the Chinese community. No longer could the various former Chinese organizations provide the protection from outside authority which they had afforded under the Dutch administration.²¹

Overseas Chinese and the Indonesian Republic

At the end of World War II and into the period of Indonesian independence which followed, the Chinese community was represented largely by an organizational structure inherited from the Japanese occupation. With the withdrawal of the Dutch, an economic power vacuum was left. The Chinese, many of whom moved from rural to urban areas at this time, were the logical ones to fill it. They did so, but not without severe resentment on the part of the Indonesians. The new Indonesian Government reduced Chinese immigration quotas in 1949, giving preference to professional persons.²² A number of restrictions against illegal entry followed, but were not enforced.²³ However, no serious government action to limit Chinese economic power was taken during this early period of Indonesia's independence.

In 1950, Skinner called the Indonesian Government's attitude toward the Chinese minority "ill-defined and laissez faire." He foresaw that Indonesian politicians would attempt to reduce widespread discontent over the government's failure to comply with popular demands for the realization of economic advancement by diverting such

¹⁹ Donald Willmott, *The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia, 1900-1958*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Monograph Series, 1961. p. 19.

²⁰ Skinner, "The Chinese of Java," *loc. cit.*

²¹ Lucian Pye, *Some Observations on the Political Behavior of Overseas Chinese*. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1954. p. 4-5.

²² Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, *Minority Problems in Southeast Asia*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955. p. 8.

²³ *Ibid.*

hostility toward the Chinese.²⁴ Other observers comment that measures such as closing Chinese schools, deporting Communist Chinese teachers, and seizure of subversive textbooks and literature had been resorted to by other Southeast Asian governments during this period. Indonesia was actually one of the last to invoke sanctions against her overseas Chinese minority, but such measures were finally effected.

The acts directed against the Chinese community after 1955 must be viewed in their total national context. First, the latent as well as expressed animosities against the Chinese which had long existed, were reinforced as a result of the economic grip which overseas Chinese tightened on the fledgling nation. Secondly, material progress as promised by national leaders had frequently been left unfulfilled; a scapegoat was desirable in diverting the attention of the masses. As under the Dutch, the Chinese furnished such a scapegoat. Thirdly, by 1958 a full-scale rebellion against the central government in Java had broken out, led by military commanders in the outer islands. They protested that their territories produced most of the nation's wealth, but received disproportionately small political representation.²⁵ The seat of political power is in Java, where the bulk of Indonesia's population lives.²⁶ Although the Chinese living in these outer islands are commonly considered to be sympathetic to the Chinese Communist regime in Peking, some Kuomintang²⁷ sympathy also existed among these rural Chinese.²⁸ It was widely believed that these latter anti-Communist Chinese were collaborating with the rebels. Finally, as throughout Southeast Asia, the greater part of the Chinese minority was viewed as being a possible vehicle of Chinese Communist expansion, and consequently as representing a threat to the nation's security. In view of the fact that extensive control of Chinese schools, press, and labor unions was already exercised by pro-Peking Chinese,²⁹ the Indonesian government had some reason for alarm.

Evidently Indonesia's apprehensiveness concerning Peking's intentions toward the Indonesian overseas Chinese was dispelled somewhat by the "spirit of Bandung." In 1955, at the Afro-Asian conference at Bandung, near Djakarta, China's Foreign Minister Chou En-lai assured those Asian governments having Chinese minorities that he was willing to settle the status of overseas Chinese citizenship with

²⁴ Skinner, *Report on the Chinese in Southeast Asia*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1950. p. 86.

²⁵ H. M. Vlekke. *Indonesia's Struggle, 1957-1958*. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Affairs, 1959. p. 5-21.

²⁶ It should be noted that most of the depth studies of Indonesia have been conducted in Java, which, while containing the bulk of population, is not always representative of conditions which prevail on the other islands.

²⁷ "Kuomintang" is a transliteration of the Chinese name of the "Nationalist Party," the dominant political party in the government of the Republic of China in Taiwan.

²⁸ David Mozingo. Personal interview, July 1962.

²⁹ Victor Purcell. "The Influence of Racial Minorities," *Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956. p. 236.

any of them.³⁰ China's long-standing policy of regarding her expatriates as Chinese citizens despite their residence abroad, on the principle of *jus sanguinis* (i.e., ancestry decides nationality),³¹ had created problems for all Southeast Asian nations and their colonial predecessors. A treaty was signed at Bandung between the Peking authorities and Indonesia in which the Chinese Communist regime renounced claim to Chinese who voluntarily chose Indonesian citizenship.³² However, it was feared by many Indonesians that the terms of the treaty might well force many uncommitted Chinese into the Chinese Communist camp. Not before very strained relations between the two governments concerning the overseas Chinese question had at last abated was the treaty finally ratified by the Indonesian Government, late in 1960.³³

Early in 1957, a conference of Indonesian military leaders issued a statement from Djakarta urging stricter control on "foreigners" in all fields.³⁴ On July 1, a "head tax" was levied on all "alien residents."³⁵ It appeared at the outset that the drive against Chinese was aimed at Kuomintang sympathizers only. As rebellion grew in the outer islands, the central government gave to the military the right to seize banks, business enterprises and estates owned or operated by pro-Kuomintang Chinese,³⁶ and to close Kuomintang schools. Seen initially by many as a victory for Peking,³⁷ the acts against the Chinese pro-Nationalists eventually began to worry even some Communist Chinese embassy officials. In 1959, one observer remarked of these representatives of mainland China:

They knew what has now become obvious to all, the Indonesians hit first at the right wing Chinese the better to strike the leftists afterward. "Subversive Kuomintang," and now "foreign" or "alien" are convenient accusations by which the Indonesians hope to realize one of their fondest dreams, the expulsion of all Chinese from Indonesia, whatever their political colour.³⁸

³⁰ Guy Wint. "China and Asia." *The China Quarterly*, No. 1. January-March, 1960. p. 65.

³¹ "Background to Dual Citizenship Treaty," *Selected Translations on Indonesia*, No. 2. Washington: Joint Publications Research Service, May 1, 1961. p. 55.

³² Willard A. Hanna. "The Chinese Take a Second Look," Part XXII, *Bung Karno's Indonesia*, Vol. VII, No. 37. New York: American Universities Field Staff Reports Service, December 3, 1959. p. 5.

³³ For discussion of the problems in this treaty, see Collina MacDougall, "The Chinese in Indonesia," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol. XXXII, No. 8. May 25, 1961. p. 361-363.

³⁴ "Control on Foreigners Urged," *Asian Recorder*, Vol. III, No. 19. May 4-10, 1957. p. 1439.

³⁵ Hanna, *loc. cit.*; "Tax on Foreigners," *Asian Recorder*, Vol. III, No. 29. July 13-19, 1957. p. 1541.

³⁶ Hanna, *op. cit.*, p. 6; P. T. Plotrow, "Overseas Chinese," *Editorial Research Reports*, Vol. II. Washington: affiliated with *Congressional Quarterly*, 1958. p. 796.

³⁷ Plotrow, *op. cit.*, p. 810.

³⁸ Arslan Humbaraci. "Anti-Chinese Feelings in Indonesia." *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol. XXVII. September 10, 1959. p. 390.

By April 1959, Ambassador Huang Chen of the Chinese Communist regime lodged a protest with the Indonesian Government concerning the closure of 1500 "foreign" schools, the majority of which were generally considered to be pro-Peking.³⁹ A government regulation forbidding aliens to conduct certain kinds of businesses in rural areas was promulgated on November 16, 1959, and was followed by a military decree banning aliens from residence in certain rural areas, principally in West Java. Some 300,000 shopkeepers were affected and were subject to compliance with the decree by January 1, 1960.⁴⁰ The Chinese Embassy and Peking deplored such action and the violence which followed, particularly in West Java. The Indonesian Government finally expelled, or limited the movements of, a number of Communist Chinese embassy and consular officials, accusing them of inciting overseas Chinese to defy the order.⁴¹ In October 1959, the mainland Chinese Government volunteered to repatriate any Chinese who wished to return to China, chartering ships to transport the thousands of overseas Chinese who responded.⁴² China's enthusiasm for this plan dampened somewhat when some 40,000 overseas Chinese accepted repatriation during the first 5 months of 1960. Quietly she revised her policy, sending progressively fewer transport ships to Indonesia.⁴³

The Chinese Communist regime faced a severe conflict of interests. On the one hand, it wanted to protect its often useful expatriates in Indonesia; on the other, it recognized the necessity to remain on friendly terms with the neutralist government in Djakarta. Ultimately, the regime gave priority to the latter interest. By March 31, 1960, it was announced that a meeting of Indonesian President Sukarno and the Chinese Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Chen I had resulted in an official Chinese promise to appeal to overseas Chinese in Indonesia to abide by Indonesian law and to contribute to Indonesia's development. By mid-August, relations had considerably improved, and the long-pending Dual Nationality Treaty was finally ratified on December 15, 1960.⁴⁴ Its provisions were considered to give the advantage to the Communist Chinese.⁴⁵ The "spirit of Bandung" appeared to have returned. But a Dual Nationality Treaty, which in certain circumstances failed to provide the central government with sufficient control over its Chinese minority, left unanswered many questions as to future overseas Chinese-Indonesian relations.

³⁹ "Closure of Chinese Schools," *Asian Recorder*, Vol. V, No. 18. May 28, 1959. p. 2641.

⁴⁰ *Keessing's Contemporary Archives*, Vol. XII. London: Keessing's Publications, Ltd., 1959-1960. p. 17186-A.

⁴¹ David Mozingo, "New Developments in China's Relations With Indonesia," *Current Scene*, Vol. I, No. 24. Hong Kong: USIA, February 5, 1962. p. 2.

⁴² MacDougall, *op. cit.*, p. 361.

⁴³ Mozingo, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

⁴⁴ MacDougall, *loc. cit.*

⁴⁵ Mozingo, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

II. Sociological Origins of Chinese Separateness

Certain inherent sociological or psychological factors have reinforced the Chinese desire to remain apart. While some of these factors isolated the Chinese from Indonesia as a whole, they were not always successful in solidifying the Chinese community itself. The following discussion of the internally disunified Chinese community precedes an examination of other sociological and psychological elements which isolated and, correspondingly, tended to weld together the overseas Chinese.

Divisions Within the Chinese Community

Despite Dutch regulations during the colonial period which isolated the Chinese from the greater Indonesian society, a resulting unity among the Chinese failed to materialize. Early divisions in the Chinese community were based upon various dialect groups coming from different home communities in China, as well as distinct Chinese civic organizations, which tended to decentralize sources of leadership and divide Chinese loyalties.

The most enduring division which has occurred among the overseas Chinese is that which exists between *peranakans* and *totoks*. Persons of Chinese descent who are born in Indonesia are called *peranakans*, literally translated as "half-caste," although they may or may not have Indonesian blood. Those who are Indonesian residents but are China-born are called *totoks* (new-comers) or *singkehs*. However, the matter is further complicated by the fact that the term *totoks* is sometimes used to refer to Chinese who were born in Indonesia, but are distinguished from the *peranakan* by a greater unwillingness to become assimilated into Indonesian or even *peranakan* society and a correspondingly more extensive orientation to China and things Chinese. Since the *peranakan* community has been established longer in Indonesia, it is considered to be more susceptible to assimilation into Indonesian culture than are the *totoks*.

Certain other factors underlie the differences between these two

groups. *Totoks* tended to settle in rural areas, engaged as small vendors or plantation workers; *peranakans* tended to be more urbanized.¹ The earlier establishment of *peranakan* commerce distinguishes the *peranakans* economically from the often penniless *totok* newcomers. Cultural as well as economic differences are important. For example, the *peranakans* may practice such traditional behavior as the maintenance of a family altar to ancestors; but their relatively greater interest in Dutch education during the colonial period, and their easing of traditional Chinese kinship patterns, indicate the extent of their weakening cultural ties with China. *Totoks*, on the other hand, are more immersed in the culture and politics of China than are their *peranakan* neighbors.²

Political differences account for another division among overseas Chinese. Pye reports that after 1911, all the "factions and cliques" of China would be apparent among the overseas Chinese, with a preponderance of power among those who supported the dominant group in China.³ In the early part of the century, these political differences occurred between adherents of the Imperial Chinese Government and the followers of the Chinese nationalist movement, a situation which was reproduced to a considerable extent during the 1950's with loyalties divided between the Nationalist and Communist Chinese.

In his description of a "three-way split" which existed among overseas Chinese at the outset of the Japanese invasion, Skinner implies that *totok-peranakan* differences are not altogether divorced from cultural and political divisions within the Chinese community. He distinguishes among: (1) a Western-Dutch orientated elite whose children attended Dutch schools, composed probably of well-to-do *peranakans*; (2) a mercantile *totok* middle-class looking to China for inspiration culturally and to the Kuomintang politically, whose children usually attended private Chinese schools; and (3) lower economic and social class *peranakans* whose children attended Chinese Malay or "native schools" if, indeed, they attended schools at all.⁴

Following World War II, new divisions within the Chinese community emerged. The success with which the Chinese Communists expelled the Nationalists from the Chinese mainland, and their subsequent establishment of a new Chinese regime, occasioned political realignment among the overseas Chinese communities throughout Southeast Asia. Again, a basic *peranakan-totok* split appears to underlie the new reorganization of loyalties. In this latter division, *peranakans* have tended to be more pro-Kuomintang, or apolitical, in

¹ David Mozingo. Personal interview, July, 1962.

² Willmott, *The Chinese of Semarang*, *passim*.

³ Pye, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

⁴ Skinner, "The Chinese of Java," p. 4.

orientation as a result of their greater economic interest vested in Indonesia and weaker cultural ties with China. A more extensive source of pro-Peking support has come from *totoks*; ⁵ many still maintain close family ties with persons in China and, as recent arrivals, they have a closer cultural commitment to China and correspondingly less economic interest in Indonesia.

Relationships Between the Overseas Chinese and Indonesians

One might deduce from the lack of cohesion among overseas Chinese that they would have a tendency to become absorbed into the total society in which they lived. However, the image of the overseas Chinese in Indonesia is that of a group which is neither internally unified nor assimilated into Indonesian society. An examination of the causes which have retarded Chinese assimilation into the larger society is vital to an understanding of the relationship between Chinese and Indonesians.

Probably the clearest distinction between the Chinese and Indonesians arises from their differing economic roles. The Chinese, as a result of their economic position, have exerted a large measure of control over the Indonesians. The energy and business acumen of the overseas Chinese, conditioned, perhaps, by the environment in the competitive seacoast cities of Southern China from which they came,⁶ stands in sharp contrast to the more complacent manner of the indigenous people. Prior to the time of the Indonesian Republic, the economy of the area was based upon barter trade⁷ unless economic functions were performed by the Chinese. Although it was historically the Dutch who really controlled the major economic interests of the Indies, the Chinese were used by them to perform intermediary marketing functions; in this role, they constituted the group actually "seen" by the native population. Thus, the Chinese were "direct targets of native hostility when dissatisfaction developed over economic conditions."⁸ The very fact that Chinese have tended to acquire more in the way of material wealth than their Indonesian countrymen places them in a separate economic class, which further isolates them from the Indonesians.

An additional wedge has been driven between the Chinese and Indonesians by the Indonesian Government's apparent organized at-

⁵ Skinner, *Report on the Chinese . . . in Southeast Asia*, p. 66.

⁶ George Kahin, "Indonesia," *Major Governments of Asia*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958. p. 487; Ta Chen, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

⁷ Mohammad Hatta, *Past and Future*. Address delivered at Gadjah Mada University, November 27, 1956. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960. p. 2.

⁸ Pye, *loc. cit.*

tempts to direct hostility toward the Chinese. Such encouragement of anti-Chinese sentiment has had a unifying effect upon the indigenous society, whose nationalistic awakening lagged somewhat behind that of China. In fact, the nationalist movement in Indonesia, the *Sarikat Islam*, was created as an anti-Chinese drive by Javanese batik workers in 1911 and 1912.⁹ Another manifestation of the use of anti-Chinese sentiments to unify the Indonesian people often may be observed in official Dutch and Indonesian Government statements. A kind of anti-foreignism is engendered among Indonesians in response to such terms as "foreign orientals," which are applied freely to the Chinese by government officials.¹⁰ As might be expected, such a lack of sensitivity in dealing with the Chinese has produced resentment among members of the minority community. The present government has been accused frequently of purposely whipping up anti-Chinese sentiment among the indigenous people in order to divert popular attention from ills in the society for which the government might be held accountable and to solidify national consciousness among indigenous citizens.¹¹ The net effect of such behavior by the government has been to intensify Chinese separateness, despite official appeals to absorb Chinese of Indonesian citizenship into Indonesian society.

Religion has played a part in the estrangement between the Chinese community and the Indonesians. The majority of Indonesians are of the Moslem faith, the nature of which has been described as particularly "uncompromising" in Indonesia.¹² Van der Kroef contrasts the Indonesian case with that of Burma and Thailand, where Buddhism, which is distinguished by religious tolerance, predominates; he asserts that in these Buddhist countries antagonisms between the Chinese communities and local people appear less marked.

Marriage patterns, which frequently included alliances between Chinese men and Indonesian women, have not broken down alienation between the two groups to the extent which might be expected. The first two waves of Chinese migrations have brought men only, and they regularly took local women as wives. However, these women tended to be brought into the Chinese community, and children were reared according to Chinese custom.¹³ Moreover, in the 20th century, whole

⁹ Harrison, *Southeast Asia*, p. 241; Amry Vandenbosch, "Chinese Thrust in Southeast Asia," *Current History*, December, 1959, p. 334.

¹⁰ Victor Purcell, "Nationality of the Chinese in Southeast Asia," *India Quarterly*, Vol. XI, October-December, 1955, p. 346; Willmott, *The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia*, 1956, p. 4.

¹¹ Hanna, *op. cit.*, p. 59; Skinner, *Local, Ethnic, and National Loyalties in Village Indonesia*, p. 8.

¹² J. M. van der Kroef, *Indonesia in the Modern World*, Vol. I. Bandung: Masa Baru, 1954, p. 219.

¹³ Raymond Kennedy, *Islands and Peoples of the Indies*. Baltimore: The Lord Baltimore Press, 1943, p. 2.

totok families as well as single Chinese women arrived in the Indies, a development which slowed the trend toward intermarriage between Indonesian and Chinese, and further impeded Chinese assimilation into the Indonesian mainstream.¹⁴ Although the traditional self-contained Chinese family unit has broken down considerably since World War II, there does not appear to be a resulting increase in Chinese assimilation with other population groups. In 1954, for example, the family basis of Chinese business was reported to be nearly as strong as ever.¹⁵

The generally upwardly mobile nature of overseas Chinese society has not been conducive to Chinese-Indonesian assimilation.¹⁶ Under the Dutch, there was small incentive for the overseas Chinese to seek out indigenous society, which was placed in the lowest social classification. Since Dutch society was closed to them, overseas Chinese turned to China for inspiration and support in their search for status.¹⁷ Palmier's research in a Javanese town in the early 1950's led him to believe that there was "little positive dislike between the two groups [Indonesian and Chinese], but that their interests did not lie in association with one another but within their own groups."¹⁸ He explains that participation by either group in the activities of the other contributes nothing to their increased social, economic, or political status, and therefore there is little incentive for mutual association.¹⁹

It is a common generalization to ascribe to all Chinese an ethnocentric sense of superiority to other nations and peoples. To attribute the parochial nature of the overseas Chinese to such chauvinism would be to oversimplify. If their aloofness can be partially explained by a sense of superiority, it is also to be remembered that most Chinese came to Indonesia as illiterate coolies and laborers with little awareness of traditional Chinese culture. The Neo-Confucianism which spread among parts of the overseas Chinese community early in the 20th century, creating a desire for classical Chinese education, was actually reflective of a desire for the elevation of status.²⁰ This orientation toward China, which implied belief in Chinese cultural superiority, was of little importance before China's own nationalist movement, but it has operated subsequently to reinforce the separation of the Chinese from the rest of Indonesian society.

¹⁴ Meljer, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

¹⁵ van der Kroef, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

¹⁶ Skinner, "The Chinese of Java," p. 2.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹⁸ Leslie Palmier. *Social Status and Power in Java*. London: The Athlone Press, 1960. p. 123.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 116-17.

²⁰ Skinner, "The Chinese of Java," p. 3.

Overseas Chinese and Mainland China²¹

Despite the considerable interest shown in the overseas Chinese in the 20th century by whatever government happened to be in power on the Chinese mainland, it has not always been so. From 1712 to 1894, the official Manchu Dynasty position was one of opposition to emigration under penalty of death.²² However, in 1894, the Imperial Government began to view its prospering expatriates abroad with some interest. It began to send official emissaries to the Indies and throughout Southeast Asia. Exiled reformists from China were also among the first to bring ideas of nationalism and social reform to the overseas Chinese; they encouraged the organization of schools and discouraged overseas Chinese cultural assimilation into local society.²³ Teachers to staff these schools were frequently sent from China,²⁴ bringing with them Chinese language and culture. Many Indonesian Chinese were supporters of the nationalist movement from its outset. The Netherlands Indies Government took a dim view of these Chinese thrusts, regardless of whether they were cultural, as with the Confucian revival, or political, as with the nationalist movement; on some occasions, leaders of these factions were deported, some of the organizations were outlawed, and the Chinese press was closely supervised.²⁵

The legal status of the overseas Chinese in regard to nationality has been a subject of concern to the Chinese minority itself, the Dutch administration, whatever Chinese government controlled the Chinese mainland, and, more recently, the Indonesian Government. The citizenship law of 1892, under the Dutch, designated the Chinese as "foreigners" but retained jurisdiction over those Chinese in the Indies. In 1909, the Manchu Government of China enacted a law of its own, claiming as Chinese citizens any child of a Chinese mother or father regardless of birthplace (*jus sanguinis*). The Dutch countered in 1910 with a revision of the 1892 law which claimed that all persons born in the Indies were Dutch subjects (*jus soli*), although Chinese still were not given full rights of Dutch citizenship under the law.²⁶ Each government proceeded to consider the Chinese as "its" citizens,

²¹ Since Indonesia does not maintain diplomatic relations with the Nationalist Government in Taiwan, and thus denies to the authorities in Taiwan the use of consular facilities in Indonesia which are available to the Communist Chinese, relationships between the Taiwan authorities and overseas Chinese in Indonesia are limited. However, the Nationalists in Taiwan, as well as the Communist Chinese, have attempted to elicit funds and exert influence among the Chinese of Indonesia. The Nationalists have had some success, as evidenced by the existence of pro-Kuomintang schools and press.

²² Ta Chen, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

²³ Willmott, *The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia, 1900-1958*, p. 4.

²⁴ Purcell, *The Chinese in Southeast Asia*. London: Oxford University Press, 1951. p. 528.

²⁵ Willmott, *The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia, 1958*, p. 6.

²⁶ Willmott, *The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia, 1900-1958*, p. 13-15.

and the Netherlands Indies Government refused to comply with Chinese consular demands to participate in the representation of people whom they (the Dutch) considered to be Dutch subjects.²⁷

Sentiments favorable to the revolutionary movement in China were evidenced among Indonesian Chinese even before the revolt which brought China's Manchu Dynasty to an end in 1911. At the close of World War I, the Nationalists tried to unify all the diverse overseas Chinese organizations and groups within Southeast Asian countries and colonies in support of their cause, to the annoyance of the authorities in these areas.²⁸

At about the same time, Marxist movements were beginning to appear inside the Indies and China. One branch of *Sarekat Islam*, founded in 1911 as a quasi-religious Indonesian nationalist movement in opposition to Chinese economic strength, supported Marxism,²⁹ as did the Indies Social Democratic Association, founded in 1914.³⁰ It should be stressed that, while Communist groups in China were making appeals to lower class overseas Chinese,³¹ the Communist groups in Indonesia drew their support primarily from Indonesians.³² The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), founded in 1927, and presently the most important source of Communist strength in Indonesia, has been essentially indigeneous in character. Inasmuch as the overseas Chinese represented capitalistic endeavor, the PKI has lost no opportunity to attack them when it has appeared to be within its interest to do so.³³

Throughout the period of China's official recognition of its expatriates (1894 to the present period), the Chinese Government has encouraged the remittance of funds to the "homeland"; this it has done by playing upon familial relationships between mainland Chinese and their overseas relatives and, more recently, by stressing loyalties to "China" as a national entity. Such contributions have been made despite the Republic of Indonesia's efforts to curtail them.

Although there may be some question as to whether it has been in their best interests to do so, the overseas Chinese in Indonesia have often supported the current regime in Peking both through financial contributions and in spirit. Understanding of the difficult position of the Chinese in adopted countries where they are at best only step-

²⁷ G. H. Bousquet. *A French View of the Netherlands Indies*. London: Oxford University Press, 1940. p. 122.

²⁸ Plotrow, *op. cit.*, p. 803.

²⁹ Harrison, *Southeast Asia*, p. 243.

³⁰ Jeanne S. Mintz. "Marxism in Indonesia," *Marxism in Southeast Asia*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959. p. 176.

³¹ Plotrow, *loc. cit.*

³² George M. Kahin. "Indonesian Politics and Nationalism," *Asian Nationalism and the West*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953. p. 140.

³³ Mintz, "Marxism in Indonesia," p. 236-37.

children, and their propensity toward upward mobility in societies which do not accommodate that propensity except in the economic sphere, helps one to account for the persistent allegiance to "homeland" which they often exhibit. The relationship between the Chinese abroad and China tends to be more personal than ideological. The overseas Chinese, given little opportunity to achieve status in the larger societies in which they live, tend to take pride in any growth in the power and prestige of China; it would likely be so no matter what government controlled the Chinese mainland, and no matter what ideology it preached.

III. Overseas Chinese Education in Historical Perspective

It has been established that the overseas Chinese in Indonesia have been sufficiently motivated to remain separate from the larger Indonesian society. How, then, might the Chinese translate their desire to remain apart into positive action? Certainly the organization of a Chinese press, which published in Chinese as well as Malay, was one means by which the Chinese maintained cohesiveness. Another existed in the considerable number of Chinese organizations which appeared around the turn of the 20th century, designed to provide for those needs of the Chinese community which were not satisfied by the Dutch administration. A third significant instrument of unification and cohesion, despite the internal political and cultural differences which it sometimes may have intensified, was separate Chinese education. As Lea Williams has recently stated, "Education . . . was the chief means for the nationalist mobilization and the social, political, economic and psychological elevation of the Indies Chinese."¹

Chinese Education During the Colonial Era

A marked rise of overseas Chinese enthusiasm for education coincided precisely with the rise of Chinese nationalism, around 1900. Prior to that time, the Indies Chinese had generally neglected education, although there were some few exceptions to this pattern. The Cantonese and Hakkas had a higher rate of literacy when they came to the Indies than did most other Chinese linguistic groups. From the beginning, they established schools using their own dialects as the medium of instruction.² An early European observer in the Indies, Wouter Schouten, reports that in addition to home study, there was at least one Chinese school in Batavia (Djakarta) during the 18th century which had "thirty or forty pupils."³ Begun by wealthy

¹ Lea E. Williams. *Overseas Chinese Nationalism: The Genesis of the Pan-Chinese Movements in Indonesia, 1900-1916*. Glencoe, Ill.: The Fress Press, 1960. p. 199.

² Skinner, *Report on the Chinese in Southeast Asia*, p. 68.

³ Purcell, *The Chinese in Southeast Asia*, p. 527.

Chinese merchants for their own and other local children, these schools reflected the classical education of China as it had existed for hundreds of years. The teachers, who were brought from the coastal areas of China, were noted for the strict discipline which they maintained.⁴ The curriculum included "the use of the abacus, rote-learning of the 'Four Books' (*Analects*, *The Doctrine of the Mean*, *The Great Learning*, and *Mencius*), and how to write a conventional letter."⁵ It is to be remembered that such schooling was limited to a very few persons and was available less often in the outer islands than in urban centers of trade.

In 1816, the Dutch opened their first public school in the Indies. It was intended only for European children. However, 2 years later a provision was adopted making such European schools available to Indonesian children as well.⁶ In effect, places in these schools were almost inaccessible to non-Europeans because of the requirements that students know the Dutch language and come from families of acceptable financial and social status.⁷ In 1854, the Governor General of the Indies was directed by the home government to encourage the establishment of schools for the "native population" with the expressed purpose of training officials for the lower echelons of the administrative bureaucracy. Schools of two types were provided for Indonesians, still on a very limited basis: the "native school of the first class" was designed for children of high-ranking and wealthy families, while the "native school of the second class" provided what was considered a suitable education for the children of low-ranking officials and middle-class Indonesian families.⁸

Educational facilities for indigenous people were broadened with the introduction of the Dutch "ethical policy" around the turn of the century. However, both the provisions of the 1854 directive and of the later ones were interpreted to exclude the Chinese, despite Chinese protests that they paid higher taxes than did the Indonesians.⁹ In some rare cases, Chinese were admitted to these schools at a higher fee than was charged to the indigenous people.¹⁰ Whether or not they qualified for admission to the schools of the "first class" depended upon their economic and social status and their ability to pass an examination in the Dutch language;¹¹ since they considered themselves su-

⁴ Willmott, *The Chinese of Semarang*, p. 170.

⁵ Purcell, *The Chinese in Southeast Asia*, loc. cit.

⁶ Raden Loekman Djajadiningrat. *From Illiteracy to University; Educational Development in the Netherlands Indies*. Quebec: Bulletin of the Netherlands and Netherlands Indies Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942. p. 29.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 29-30.

⁸ Purcell, *The Chinese in Southeast Asia*, p. 528.

⁹ Willmott, *The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia*, 1956. p. 2.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Djajadiningrat, *op. cit.*, p. 30-31.

terior to the Indonesians, the Chinese infrequently requested admission to the "second class" schools, where they might be admitted only if there was room after all those Indonesian children desiring admission had been accommodated.¹²

In 1900, a group of well-to-do Chinese merchants in Batavia organized the *Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan* (THHK), marking the first significant attempt of the overseas Chinese to provide education where the Dutch would not. This organization began by attempting to promote Chinese nationalism on the basis of Confucianism with the hope of welding together the factionalized overseas Chinese. While the THHK provided other services, its chief means for realizing the goal of a unified overseas Chinese community was to operate schools employing as a medium of instruction the national spoken language of China (*Kuo yü*), which was based upon the Mandarin dialect of North China.¹³ A number of these schools were opened in Batavia, and as increasing THHK branches opened in other urban centers, more private Chinese schools appeared.

Although it was the THHK's desire to maintain the use of the one standardized Chinese dialect, that was not always possible because of the difficulties in obtaining the services of enough sufficiently qualified teachers. Many Chinese would have doubtless preferred Dutch as the language medium in these schools, because of its prestige factor in the Indies. But employing Dutch teachers would have been too expensive, and not in keeping with the goals of the organizations which operated these schools. According to one source, the medium of instruction in some of the early private Chinese schools was English, since English-speaking Chinese teachers could be hired cheaply from Singapore. This latter alternative is reported to have been favorably received, since English had become the commercial language of Asia and most Chinese were destined to be engaged in commerce.¹⁴

The Dutch administration felt that the curriculum employed in these schools failed to equip an individual for life in the Indies, since the teachers were largely from China, the schools periodically visited by "inspectors" from the Chinese mainland, and practices were patterned after those in China.¹⁵

The Dutch were concerned with more than the suitability of the curriculum for the individual Chinese. The events occurring in China leading up to the Chinese revolution in 1911 were considered as threatening the colonial power of the Dutch, whose interests lay in

¹² W. L. Cator. *The Economic Position of the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936. p. 84.

¹³ Wilmott, *The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia*, 1956. p. 3-4.

¹⁴ Purcell, *The Chinese in Southeast Asia*, loc. cit.

¹⁵ Cator, loc. cit.

maintaining the *status quo*, especially when the message of revolution and reform was being carried to the already dissatisfied overseas Chinese. As a conciliatory measure, therefore, a number of sanctions imposed against the Chinese were dropped, and, in 1908, the Dutch yielded to long-standing Chinese demands by opening the first Dutch-Chinese schools.¹⁶ In 1909, the Dutch began to grant subsidies to the existing Chinese schools which met certain qualifications,¹⁷ and by 1914, 27 of these Dutch-Chinese schools were in operation in Java alone.¹⁸

The period from 1908 until the Japanese occupation during World War II saw the emergence of a number of different streams of primary and secondary education in the Indies. For the indigenous people, in addition to "native education" of the "first" and "second" class, there was also the "*desa*" (village) school. For the Chinese, there were the private Chinese schools and Dutch-Chinese schools; later, Malay-Chinese schools were opened by the Dutch administration. Kennedy explains that it is characteristic of the Dutch to provide separate education for every class in a given society, presumably to prepare each for the kind of life the members of these groups would lead. Inasmuch as the Dutch were willing to allocate for educational purposes only what has been described as a "surprisingly small share of the total funds" for overall development of the Indies,¹⁹ it is understandable that Dutch aims to provide separate education for every class left most non-European inhabitants of the islands with no educational facilities at all. By 1940, 93 percent of the total Indies population was still considered as illiterate.²⁰ By the way of contrast, it was found in 1936 that out of the 200,000 Chinese children between the ages of 6 and 14, about 98,000 had received some sort of education, the majority having attended THHK-sponsored schools receiving no government subsidy.²¹

Schools for Overseas Chinese

Native Schools.—While the Dutch had previously opened a few schools of the "first" and "second" class for the indigenous people, the first real attempt at a national educational program was the *desa*, or village, school undertaken in 1907. Its curriculum of reading and

¹⁶ Robert van Niel. *The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite*. The Hague: W. van Hoeve, Ltd., 1960. p. 87.

¹⁷ Purcell, *The Chinese in Southeast Asia*, p. 529.

¹⁸ Willmott, *The Chinese of Semarang*, p. 19.

¹⁹ Raymond Kennedy. *The Ageless Indies*. New York: The John Day Company, 1942. p. 137, 140.

²⁰ Jeanne S. Mintz. *Indonesia, A Profile*. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1961. p. 67.

²¹ Purcell, *The Chinese in Southeast Asia*. p. 531.

writing in the vernacular, arithmetic, and nature study was aimed at reducing illiteracy and making the people receptive to government programs.²² A continuation school was offered after the 3-year *desa* school program, to teach the Dutch language. "This was considered useful for persons who might come into frequent contact with Europeans in their future work . . . as policemen, train or streetcar conductors, etc." since "it cannot be expected that the European population [will] have an adequate knowledge of Malay or any other native language . . ." ²³ The curriculum of the *desa* school was noticeably free of any consideration of the social studies. Two observers of this early education reflected the thinking of most colonial administrators when they reported in 1909: "Education unfits him [a member of "native" society] for the life of his people and makes him dissatisfied; . . . the longer he is kept from the influences of civilization the better it will be for him, for the good cannot be introduced without the bad."²⁴ It might be added that dissatisfied colonial peoples, with the means afforded through education to protest, imposed a threat to the metropolitan power's control. The proportionately small Chinese community had already created problems for the administration. The Indies Government had no intention of allowing such dissatisfactions to be manifested by the majority of the Indonesian population.

The Chinese Schools.—The curriculum of these early schools reflected the neo-Confucianism which was being brought from China, both directly, through emissaries of the Imperial Government, and by way of Malaya. The medium of instruction was sometimes *Kuo yü*, but more often it was the dialect spoken by the majority of overseas Chinese in a given area or part of a city. However, as the nationalist movement gained momentum in China, its program of educational reforms, including the use of the national language, was adopted by most Chinese schools in the Indies. Until the late 1920's when the Dutch Government insisted somewhat more strongly than before that they "abstain from education with a political tendency," these Chinese schools featured weekly ceremonies in front of Sun Yat-sen's portrait. Unhampered for the most part by Dutch regulation, teachers and textbooks came directly from China.²⁵

One source refers to the disparity between the urban and rural private Chinese schools, in that higher quality education was offered

²² Djajadiningrat, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

²⁴ S. Baring-Gould and C. A. Bampfylde. *A History of Sarawak Under Its Two White Rajahs, 1839-1908*. London: Henry Sotheran & Co., 1909. p. 439-40.

²⁵ Meijer, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

in population centers.²⁶ Skinner observes that the Chinese schools were generally superior to the Dutch or Indonesian schools,²⁷ although they were admittedly directed toward different ends. Primary textbooks for the Chinese schools during the preindependence era received some praise as being well selected and based upon modern principles of child psychology.²⁸ However, the Dutch objected to the introduction of "Chinese politics and instruction in the Kuomintang party line" in schools of upper primary and higher levels.²⁹ What little attention was devoted to Indonesia in the Chinese curriculum stressed the economic role of the Chinese immigrants in the South Seas, and blamed the Manchu Government for having allowed the European powers to claim the Southeast Asian territories which had once been tributaries of China.³⁰ These schools reinforced Chinese national consciousness by purposely displaying wall maps showing China's vast geographical expanse in comparison to the Indies and other nations.³¹

Finding suitable teachers for these schools was a problem for the Chinese organizations which sponsored them. While the Chinese schools were dominated by neo-Confucianism, only the inferior scholars of China, the "dregs of the Chinese literate class,"³² could be induced to come to the Indies to teach. When the THHK leaders decided to organize the schools along Chinese nationalist lines, it was very difficult to obtain qualified teachers who could teach in *Kuo yü*. Teachers from China, imported by way of Malaya and Japan at considerable expense, were imbued with Chinese nationalist spirit and had received a smattering of the "new education" through Western contact.³³ That this new breed of teacher did not altogether satisfy the overseas Chinese organizations which sponsored schools is evidenced by reported efforts of the Batavia THHK to replace such young teachers with older men.³⁴ It may be supposed that the THHK did not wish to provide, in their schools' curriculum, concepts of Chinese nationalism at the expense of thoroughness in other subject areas.

The Dutch administration permitted the growth of private Chinese education under a wary eye. Its objections to the schools were not only that they were extremely nationalistic in character, but also that they failed to provide useful knowledge for life in Indonesia, and that they tended to reproduce the political factionalism of China within

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

²⁷ Skinner, "The Chinese of Java," p. 4.

²⁸ Meijer, *loc. cit.*

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

³¹ Williams, *Overseas Chinese Nationalism*, p. 72.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 66.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 73-75.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

Indonesia. Throughout the 1920's and 1930's, as Communist influence was evidenced in some of these Chinese schools, the Dutch were swift to ban texts which they designated as "objectionable," to expel teachers, and to warn overseas Chinese students who planned further study in Communist-controlled areas in China that they would be denied re-entry into Indonesia.³⁵

Although Embree reported in 1934 that outside of the government system of education for Chinese there were only "... a few schools . . . organized and supported by the Chinese themselves,"³⁶ the largest single source of education for Chinese children was actually the THHK schools; in 1936, for example, some 45,000 children were attending these schools. Another 13,500 children were reported to be attending special Dutch-Chinese schools under private management, presumably mission schools or schools with some Dutch subsidy offering courses on the Dutch language along with an otherwise Chinese curriculum. In contrast, the Chinese attending all types of Dutch-supported schools, numbered only 38,500.³⁷

The Dutch-Chinese Schools.—As soon as Chinese were permitted access to Dutch education, some of them, *peranakans* particularly, responded in considerable number. As early as 1909, Baring-Gould and Bampfylde commented upon the difficulty in "getting . . . [the Indonesians] to come to be taught" while the Chinese constituted the majority of students in many government and mission schools.³⁸

Although the Dutch were critical of the Chinese schools for duplicating the education offered in China, the Dutch-Chinese schools which began to be established in 1908 had the same characteristic with respect to Holland. The only difference between the Dutch schools and Dutch-Chinese schools was that the latter featured an initial preparatory year in which the Dutch language was taught. After that year, the medium of instruction was Dutch.³⁹

While these schools failed to satisfy the Chinese, in the sense that they omitted Chinese language and culture, they had one distinct advantage. They provided the means by which examinations for the middle school and university could be taken and access to such institutions obtained. One could go into business, as most Chinese did, with the preparation of the Chinese schools, but the only avenue to the professions was through the Dutch educational system. Even higher education in Holland might be an ultimate prospect for a diligent Chinese student.

³⁵ Meljer, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

³⁶ Edwin R. Embree, *Island India Goes to School*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934, p. 53.

³⁷ Purcell, *The Chinese in Southeast Asia*, *loc. cit.*

³⁸ Baring-Gould and Bampfylde, *op. cit.*, p. 439, 442.

³⁹ Willmott, *The Chinese of Semarang*, p. 170.

The Chinese felt that the 130 Dutch-Chinese schools in existence throughout the Indies by 1930⁴⁰ were insufficient for their educational needs. Yet the cost of expanding the program was considered prohibitive by the Dutch, in the face of their own economic problems at home during the 1930's. In addition, the Dutch-Chinese schools, like the private Chinese schools, faced severe problems in finding teachers as increasing numbers of Chinese children were enrolled. "Normal schools," at which tuition and living expenses were paid by the Dutch government, were opened to encourage young Chinese men and women to go into the teaching profession.⁴¹ But the prospect of these low-paying positions failed to attract many Chinese, and even the graduates of such normal schools often went into business and never actually taught.⁴² The question arose of raising teachers' salaries in the Dutch-Chinese schools in order to attract persons into the teaching profession; but the colonial government protested that it would then also have to increase the salaries of Indonesian teachers trained in comparable "normal" schools in order to avoid being accused of discrimination against the Indonesians.⁴³ To do this would entail an expense the administration was not willing to incur.

Concurrent with the period of world-wide economic depression, Dutch expenditures in the Indies decreased after 1930. Expenditures for education declined from some 60 million guilders in 1929 to 27 million in 1937. By 1937, only 61 of the Dutch-Chinese schools were still in operation.⁴⁴

Dutch-Chinese education had come too late; its fees were often prohibitively high; it persisted in requiring a certain level of social standing of its students' parents; it contracted just when the Chinese urged its expansion. There is small wonder that the overseas Chinese community considered the Dutch-Chinese school to be a feeble attempt to meet its educational requirements.

Malay-Chinese Schools.—Shortly after the Dutch-Chinese schools were opened, the Chinese requested a more popular school system in which Malay, the most widely used Indonesian language, would be the medium of instruction.⁴⁵ This was not such a surprising request when it is considered that many *peranakans* spoke Malay rather than any of the Chinese dialects or Dutch. The Dutch refused, on the grounds that such a program for the Chinese would imply preferential treatment and inspire resentment by the Indonesians.⁴⁶ The Chinese

⁴⁰ van der Kroef, *op. cit.*, p. 223.

⁴¹ Djajadiningrat, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ Purcell, *The Chinese in Southeast Asia*, p. 530.

⁴⁴ van der Kroef, *loc. cit.*

⁴⁵ Meijer, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

continued to appeal to the Dutch to provide such schools, but not until an acute teacher shortage occurred in the Dutch-Chinese schools some 20 years later⁴⁷ did they comply. The Malay-Chinese schools, which functioned mainly in the 1930's and are reputed to have served only a small number of Chinese students, were of 6-year duration, like the Indonesian national schools. Djajadiningrat said of the Malay-Chinese schools: ". . . they are better adjusted to the environment from which the students come than the Dutch-Chinese schools. Commercial courses are included to fit students for their likely future work."⁴⁸

It is evident that as the century progressed, Chinese education became more favored among the Chinese population than Dutch schooling, primarily because its nationalistic flavor gave the student a sense of national pride and status, it prepared him for the trades, and it was accessible to more Chinese children in terms of expense and actual numbers of schools. Some well-to-do *peranakans* preferred a Dutch education for their children; but as Dutch international prestige waned and the star of a reunified China began to rise on the international horizon, in the late 1920's and early 1930's the popularity of Dutch schooling decreased among the Chinese. Certainly the closing of many Dutch-Chinese schools in the 1930's, and the corresponding continued expansion of private Chinese education, contributed significantly to Skinner's conclusion that since the 1920's an increasing number of Chinese families have sent their children to private Chinese schools. After Indonesia's independence, this trend was accentuated as additional Dutch-Chinese schools were gradually closed down for lack of teachers and funds.⁴⁹ An important element in the situation was the overseas Chinese recognition that the usefulness of the Dutch language decreased after the 1949 change of government in the Indies.

Chinese Nationalism and Education

The initial movement to open private Chinese schools in the Indies is attributed primarily to the desire of prominent *peranakan* businessmen in Batavia to unify the Chinese community.⁵⁰ When one considers the time period involved, it appears evident that this move toward unification is more understandable in terms of the rise of national consciousness in China than as a reaction to Dutch failure to provide the Chinese with separate schools. Overseas Chinese had protested the provisions for Indonesian education, which all but excluded the

⁴⁷ Purcell, *The Chinese in Southeast Asia*, loc. cit.

⁴⁸ Djajadiningrat, op. cit., p. 34.

⁴⁹ Skinner, *Report on the Chinese in Southeast Asia*, loc. cit.

⁵⁰ Willmott, *The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia*, 1956. p. 3-4; Williams, *Overseas Chinese Nationalism*, p. 66.

Chinese, since at least the middle of the 19th century; but they had failed to make any organized attempt to operate widespread private Chinese education until the turn of the century. The relationship between these activities in the Indies and the political rustlings in China, which were to culminate in 1911 in the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty, appears to be more than coincidental.

Williams describes the Confucian cultural revival about which the curriculum of early THHK schools was centered as an attempt ". . . to dignify their [the Chinese] nationalism with a cover of antiquity, to conceal its Western inspiration, and to put forward a respected and familiar symbol."⁵¹ This first classical orientation of THHK Chinese schools is distinguished from later overseas Chinese school curricula by the cultural, instead of political, nature of the nationalism inspired. The emphasis on the Chinese classics is seen as coming from Singapore, where a Confucian revival had begun among overseas Chinese as early as 1898,⁵² as well as from direct contact between the Batavia THHK leaders and the Chinese Imperial Government.⁵³ At its higher levels, the curriculum of these early schools combined the Chinese classics with mathematics and physics.

While the Confucian revival was manifesting itself through Manchu-instigated "South Seas" Chinese education, the reformists of China, who would later be leaders of the Republic after the overthrow of the Manchus, were also involved with overseas Chinese schools. Among their own efforts to mobilize support in China was reform in education.⁵⁴ Exiled political reformers from China, such as K'ang Yu-wei, made trips to the Indies and throughout Southeast Asia spreading ideas of political nationalism through education. These revolutionaries and reformists worked with local overseas Chinese organizations to set up Chinese schools with a "modern" curriculum, and sought Chinese political cohesion through the teaching of the national language.

Prior to 1911, the overseas Chinese schools frequently served as a battleground for Manchu versus Chinese reformist sentiments, a situation not unlike that which prevailed in the 1950's between the sympathies for Nationalist China and for Communist China. The Manchu Government is reported to have been alarmed at the influence exerted by Chinese revolutionaries over the rapidly multiplying Chinese schools in the Indies. As a result, it sought greater control of these schools through its consular facilities in that colony,⁵⁵ and the Chinese

⁵¹ Williams, *Overseas Chinese Nationalism*, p. 54.

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ Meijer, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

⁵⁴ Purcell, *The Chinese in Southeast Asia*, p. 526.

⁵⁵ Meijer, *loc. cit.*

Government dispatched emissaries to survey the schools in Java.⁵⁶ The results of these surveys were used to work with THHK leaders in an attempt to standardize the curriculum of Chinese schools through a program of centralized planning. In addition, overseas Chinese were invited to send THHK school graduates to China for secondary education at the expense of the Imperial Government.⁵⁷

The overseas Chinese did not play an altogether passive role in the political controversy between Chinese revolutionaries and the Imperial Government which was being aired in their schools. In what appears to have been a genuine desire to determine which would facilitate the best education for Chinese children regardless of political coloring, a contest between students of the classical versus the reformist schools was held in Batavia. Based on a set of examinations in the reading and writing of Chinese, the competition showed that students of the reformist school had scored considerably higher than did the students of the classical school.⁵⁸

By the time of the Chinese revolution in 1911, culturally oriented nationalism inspired by the Manchu regime through a Confucian curriculum was almost extinct in the Indies. Private Chinese schools tended to be organized along reformist lines ". . . increasingly imbued with a nationalistic spirit that was directed to the homeland rather than related to the [country] in which they, the overseas Chinese, lived."⁵⁹ The nature of nationalism as inspired by the schools had changed from a cultural to a political orientation.

The Dutch administration's establishment of "rival schools" in 1908 is considered to be one Dutch reaction to the threat of overseas Chinese nationalism.⁶⁰ The ineffectiveness of this measure is indicated, however, by the fact that the private Chinese schools as late as 1920 were reported to be overcrowded, but it was "difficult to get sufficient pupils for the Dutch-Chinese schools."⁶¹

The teaching staffs of these private Chinese schools and the curriculum they used were responsible for the ultimate instilling of a nationalistic spirit in the minds of young overseas Chinese. The teachers, whether recruits of the Manchu Government or young Chinese revolutionaries who had come to spread the spirit of reform, were probably not of the highest caliber. The former would likely be the "rejects"

⁵⁶ Willmott, *The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia*, 1956. p. 4.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ Harrison, *Southeast Asia*, p. 228.

⁵⁹ Williams, *Overseas Chinese Nationalism*, p. 68.

⁶⁰ Willmott, *The Chinese of Semarang*, p. 19; Meijer, *loc. cit.*

⁶¹ Cator, *loc. cit.*

of Chinese academic society, while the latter were more concerned with politics than general curriculum or teaching methods. Since the teachers were primarily from China, an Indonesian orientation was naturally absent from the school programs,⁶² even if this was not the Chinese aim. Elegant says of the classical Chinese teachers:

Those [scholars in China] who attained wisdom despite their education, rarely left China for the wild South Seas. *Hua-chiao* [overseas Chinese] students, therefore, learned little except contempt for their maladroit instructors, defiance of the local government's disapproval of Chinese language schools, and a smattering of ancient Chinese culture sufficient to convince them that it was the greatest culture the world had ever known⁶³

The overseas Chinese schools' role in popularizing the use of a single spoken version of the Chinese language was one of their most unifying functions. Willmott reports that 93 distinct Chinese dialect groups existed throughout the Indies prior to 1911.⁶⁴ Classically inspired schools had often used the vernacular of the particular Chinese community which supported them, since newly arrived Chinese tended to settle in areas inhabited by Chinese of their home dialect group. But after nationalist education was established in overseas Chinese schools, *Kuo yü* was used almost uniformly in these schools.

If the Chinese organizations had aimed to unify the overseas Chinese community through the schools, they had had considerable success. The orientation toward China instilled in students through curriculum and Chinese teachers had tended to further distinguish the Chinese from the Indonesians and the Dutch. The spreading of a national dialect understood by all graduates of the Chinese schools did much to unify distinct regional and dialect groupings inherited from the Chinese mainland. As will be explained later, *peranakan* and *totok* relationships, however, tended toward greater cleavage as the Chinese schools grew to be associated primarily with *totoks*, and *peranakans* made considerable use of Dutch-Chinese schools.

One fact remains clear: Education which omitted Indonesian culture and language from its curriculum further estranged the overseas Chinese from the country in which they lived. As a minority group educated more for life in China than in Indonesia, the overseas Chinese posed a potential threat to the Indies administration's control of its territory and peoples, regardless of whether that administration was Dutch or Indonesian.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 88.

⁶³ Robert S. Elegant, *The Dragon's Seed: Peking and the Overseas Chinese*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1959. p. 138-39.

⁶⁴ Willmott, *The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia*. 1956, loc. cit.

Chinese Education and the Japanese Occupation

Probably at no other time had the overseas Chinese community been so closely united as it was during the period of Japanese occupation. This unification was partially forced upon it through Japanese establishment of one general Chinese association to replace the diverse Chinese organizations of the past. The new association was the *Hua-Ch'iao Tsung Hui*, which administered all the affairs of the Chinese community, including the schools. Its leaders were held responsible to the Japanese authorities.⁶⁵ But the hatred of a common enemy, inspired by particular ill-treatment of the Chinese,⁶⁶ had an even stronger unifying effect upon the overseas Chinese community.

All Dutch-Chinese schools were closed, *peranakan* teachers were removed from their posts, and enrollments in Chinese schools increased greatly.⁶⁷ One writer asserts that the Japanese chided those Chinese who were unable to read "their own language" and encouraged the growth of Chinese language schools.⁶⁸ However, the implication in most writings concerning this period that all Chinese were given the opportunity for language training in Chinese schools during the Japanese occupation apparently is not completely correct. For example, Willmott reports that Semarang's two Chinese language schools were closed during the Japanese occupation; and the one Chinese school which was allowed to remain open did not teach Chinese.⁶⁹ Nonetheless, many Chinese used the "forced inactivity" of the occupation to undertake private study of *Kuo yü*. One effect of the Chinese language schools was that parents followed their children in desiring to learn the Chinese language; the publishing of books offering instruction in Chinese became a booming business.⁷⁰

The impact of education upon young Chinese during the Japanese occupation inspired strong Chinese nationalism. Former students of Dutch-Chinese schools at first hated the Chinese schools, but the relationship of the schools to China as a country which "still held out against the oppressors" made up for the deficiencies of less than perfect instruction.⁷¹

Overseas Chinese youth witnessed the flight of Dutch authority in the face of Japanese aggression, and saw the old Chinese organizations, once sources of overseas Chinese protection, collapse before the Japanese invaders. As the occupation drew to a close at war's end,

⁶⁵ Willmott, *The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia, 1900-1958*, p. 19.

⁶⁶ Elegant, *op. cit.*, p. 235.

⁶⁷ Skinner, "The Chinese of Java," *loc. cit.*

⁶⁸ Elegant, *loc. cit.*

⁶⁹ Willmott, *The Chinese of Semarang*, p. 170.

⁷⁰ Meijer, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

these old sources of power did not have the strength to return. At this juncture many young overseas Chinese, anticipating what might be expected from Indonesian authorities, cast their lot with China.

While most Kuomintang sympathizers lost their position of leadership in the Chinese community, the pro-Communist Chinese were busy throughout the war, neatly evading Japanese attempts at halting their influence. They concentrated their efforts upon youth, setting up Communist "study groups" among students and other young people,⁷² and were able to maintain discipline and organization. After the war, they were able to get their adherents to fill the vacancies left by European teachers and those pro-Kuomintang teachers who left the profession to go into business.⁷³

The early postwar period found the Chinese community in Indonesia, especially its younger members, solidified, imbued with heightened Chinese nationalism, and increasingly interested in the Chinese Communist movement in view of increasing Communist successes in China. The enforced teaching of the Chinese language during the Japanese occupation had played a significant role in producing all of these effects.

Chinese Education and the Indonesian Republic

Although new pro-Kuomintang versus pro-Chinese Communist factionalism, often reflected in a revival of the alignment of *peranakans* versus *totoks*, was to manifest itself, the earlier differences arising from the practice of incoming Chinese families to associate closely with groups from their own locale in China were greatly reduced at the close of World War II. The unification of Chinese civic organizations, a product of the Japanese occupation, brought under a central leadership in each community most of the old regional associations, commercial and trade organizations, and the private Chinese schools.⁷⁴

One phenomenon of the postwar period under the new Republic of Indonesia was the rapid growth of private Chinese education. Although usually associated with the *totok* families who had set them up and established their general character, the schools at this time were enrolling a great many more *peranakan* children than they had in the past. The disappearance of Dutch-Chinese education, and the limited accommodations of the new Indonesian national schools, along with the widespread Chinese contention that they were of inferior quality,

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 27.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

⁷⁴ Skinner, *Report on the Chinese in Southeast Asia*, p. 65.

accounted for increased *peranakan* enrollments in the Chinese institutions. While at least one-third of the children attending private Chinese schools were reported to be from *peranakan* homes in 1956,⁷⁵ a sizeable number of *peranakan* families sent their children to Christian missionary schools or Chinese-managed Indonesian language schools.⁷⁶

It was private Chinese education, as in the past, which occasioned the greatest concern among Indonesian Government officials. Managed by local boards which were periodically elected by parents and supporters, these schools had complete autonomy from government control when they accepted no government subsidy.⁷⁷ Few did so. Supporters of the schools arranged for their own fundraising; most donations were reported to be small, and school fees, which were determined by the family's ability to pay, represented the most important source of income.⁷⁸ When the Indonesian Government did not subsidize these schools, Malay was not required to be taught. *Kuo yü* was the medium of instruction, and English was the most popular second language.⁷⁹

In 1954, the *Christian Science Monitor* reported that at least 75 percent of all the Chinese teachers were pro-Communist; while the Indonesian Government was able to control to some extent the text materials used in these schools, which were imported from China or Taiwan, it had little control over the teachers.⁸⁰ As the competition between pro-Nationalist and pro-Chinese Communist sentiments grew among the overseas Chinese, the schools tended to be dominated by one or the other of these factions.

The Chinese community generally did not send its children to the national schools for a variety of reasons. One was their belief that the education available in private Chinese institutions was of higher quality than that offered by the government schools. Skinner attributes this qualitative difference to three factors: (1) the proportionately greater economic resources of the Chinese, (2) their concentration in urban areas, and (3) the importance placed by the Chinese upon upward mobility,⁸¹ and education as a means to that end. To some extent Indonesian national education represented an alternative to Chinese private education, despite the fact that it was by no means universally available. In response to the question of why more Chinese did not avail themselves of the opportunity for Indonesian national

⁷⁵ Skinner, "The Chinese of Java," *loc. cit.*

⁷⁶ Willmott, *The Chinese of Semarang*, p. 175-177.

⁷⁷ Skinner, *Report on the Chinese in Southeast Asia*, p. 68.

⁷⁸ Willmott, *The Chinese of Semarang*, p. 179.

⁷⁹ Skinner, *Report on the Chinese in Southeast Asia*, *loc. cit.*

⁸⁰ Thompson and Adloff, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

⁸¹ Skinner, "The Chinese of Java," *loc. cit.*

education, a frequent Chinese comment was that uniform education of all children in the same public school would not guarantee good Indonesian citizenship on the part of the Chinese. It was felt by many that while discriminatory practices continued to exist, the national schools could not solve the problem of "good [Indonesian] citizenship" among the Chinese.⁸² Certainly a factor such as the proximity of the schools also played a role in the choice of private Chinese education, since Chinese schools are usually located in the heart of Chinese residential areas. Finally, the fact that an education with some concentration on China's cultural heritage was desired by many Chinese parents was reflected in the swollen enrollments of private Chinese schools during the 1950's.

One significant development during this period was the increasing extent to which higher education in mainland China was being made available to overseas Chinese, and, to a lesser extent, in Taiwan. Entrance into Indonesian universities was limited; in some cases, a basis for admission was whether the prospective student or his family had supported the Indonesian revolution against the Dutch.⁸³ Most Chinese had not done so, considering their protected position under Dutch administration and their frequent estrangement from the Indonesians. Furthermore, the Chinese were often less than responsive to the availability of Indonesian higher education because they considered it to be of questionable quality. The language medium was Indonesian, a language in which few textbooks existed. Equipment, particularly for the laboratory sciences, was scarce. Toward the end of the decade of the 1950's, European educators withdrew. Operating under such limitations, the quality of Indonesian higher education declined, at least in some faculties.

At the same time, overseas Chinese students were receiving bids to attend universities in China and Taiwan at the expense of the authorities in these places. The Chinese Communist authorities claimed to offer such students high government posts on the mainland upon completion of their university training. Despite the Indonesian Government's subsequent refusal of re-entry to such students except in "exceptional cases," a substantial exodus of students took place.⁸⁴ One observer quotes a Malayan Chinese, who may well have spoken for many overseas Chinese parents throughout Southeast Asia during the 1950's:

Right now there is no place in Southeast Asia where a Chinese-speaking boy or girl can get university training. So they go to Communist China, and they never come back. We want to keep our children at home, but I can

⁸² van der Kroef, *op. cit.*, p. 224-225.

⁸³ *The Asian Recorder*, Vol. 5, No. 18 (May 28, 1959), p. 2641.

⁸⁴ Thompson and Adloff, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

understand how a youngster feels. Most look back to their own country. And if they have a chance, they'll go back to China, which has a big future, nobody can deny that.⁸⁶

Government Restrictions on Overseas Chinese Education

The Indonesian Government's position was one of concern for the undermining effects of private Chinese education upon Indonesia's attempts to consolidate control and unify its citizenry. First, there loomed the problem of Indonesian nationals among the Chinese population whose children attended these schools—that is, Chinese who had opted for Indonesian citizenship or who by reasons of birth had acquired it. Second, there were the effects of Communist or Kuomintang propaganda being disseminated among all the students of these schools, regardless of their citizenship status. As Piotrow points out, "The heart of the problem of Chinese loyalties . . . lies in the Chinese schools Traditionally, the first sentences they [the students] learn to write are: 'I am Chinese. I live in the Nanyang. I love China.'"⁸⁶ However, despite declarations that such schooling was not conducive to good Indonesian citizenship, the Indonesian Government was hard put in the early 1950's to facilitate the transfer of all its nationals into government schools, which were insufficient in number even for the indigenous population. Except for a few isolated actions, such as refusal of re-entry to students going to China for higher education, barring Communist texts, resolving that schooling should not be politically orientated, and requiring the teaching of Malay by all private schools receiving government subsidies, the government did not actually make any organized moves against these schools until 1952.⁸⁷ Increased control over texts and curricula of these schools was exercised after the Inspectorate of Foreign Education was established in the Ministry of Education during the same year.⁸⁸ According to one source, the Indonesian Government's delay in regulation of Chinese schools was due in part to pressure from the sizeable Peking diplomatic corps in Indonesia and from the PKI (the Indonesian Communist Party).⁸⁹

A pronounced change in the Indonesian Government's *laissez-faire* policy toward the Chinese schools came with a general drive against the overseas Chinese, beginning in 1957. This reversal of policy and

⁸⁶ Elegant, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

⁸⁷ P. T. Plotrow, "Overseas Chinese," *Editorial Research Reports*, Vol. II (Washington, D.C.: *Congressional Quarterly*, 1958). p. 810.

⁸⁸ Thompson and Adloff, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

⁸⁹ Willmott, *National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia, 1900-1958*, p. 73.

⁹⁰ Plotrow, *loc. cit.*

its anti-Kuomintang nature are partially explained by the presence of two factors: (1) the accusation that pro-Kuomintang Chinese were collaborating in the outer island rebellion; and (2) the fact that the elections of 1955 had resulted in a new government which was more "neutralist" in character, compared with its generally pro-Western, anti-Communist predecessor.

In March 1957, the government empowered the army to exercise its special authority reserved for periods of national emergency,⁹⁰ thus providing the legal basis for Minister of Defense Djuanda's proclamation of a military decree in November of that year. This decree facilitated considerably more control over "foreign language schools."⁹¹ The new regulations against the Chinese schools included limiting their numbers and transferring Indonesian citizens into Indonesian national schools; Chinese schools were allowed to operate only in major cities and in a few towns. Six months after the order had been issued only a few hundred such schools remained.⁹² The early part of this drive against the Chinese schools was directed at those run by Kuomintang sympathizers, and was one of a series of actions against this group.⁹³ By early 1959, virtually all of the pro-Nationalist schools were closed.⁹⁴

While many Chinese Communist sympathizers cheered the action against the pro-Nationalists, some saw the dual implication of reaction directed not only toward the pro-Kuomintang elements, but against the Chinese community generally. As Humbaraci explained in 1959: "The fact is that banning the Chinese schools, Kuomintang or Communist, as the Indonesians started doing about a year ago amounts to banning Chinese culture and this is where Peking has begun to worry."⁹⁵

Indeed, the Chinese Communists had reason for concern. The course of the anti-Chinese drive gradually shifted during the period from early 1959 through 1960, to become action against the pro-Peking Chinese, despite protests of the Communist Chinese in Peking and the PKI.⁹⁶ Indonesian Education Minister Dr. Prijono announced on April 5, 1959, that some 1,500 "foreign schools", the majority of which were Chinese, had been closed. Some 500 remained in operation, and he estimated that 90 percent of the latter were Chinese. He went on to answer the protest of Chinese Ambassador Huang Chen

⁹⁰ Mintz, *Indonesia, A Profile*, p. 173-174; Willmott, *The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia, 1900-1958*, p. 75.

⁹¹ Willmott, *The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia, 1900-1958*, loc. cit.

⁹² *Ibid.*

⁹³ See pages 6-7 for a discussion of the sanctions against the pro-Nationalist Chinese.

⁹⁴ Hanna, "The Chinese Take a Second Look," p. 6; *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, Vol. XII. London: Keesing's Publications, Ltd., 1959-1960. p. 17186-A.

⁹⁵ Humbaraci, *op. cit.*, p. 390.

⁹⁶ See pages 7-8 for a discussion of the sanctions against the pro-Peking Chinese.

against the closure of Chinese schools by saying, "... the People's Republic of China would not like so many foreign schools on their territory." Dr. Prijono admitted that a larger number of pro-Communist Chinese schools than Nationalist schools had been closed and that foreign schools were allowed to accept only non-Indonesian citizens; he added that all Chinese institutions of higher learning in Indonesia had been closed.⁹⁷

By January 1, 1961, the Dual Citizenship Treaty with mainland China was in effect, marking the end of the severe hostility which existed between Djakarta and Peking over the welfare of overseas Chinese. Before that time, a massive exodus to the Chinese mainland had taken place. Yet there still remain in Indonesia, primarily in urban centers, many Chinese, some with Indonesian citizenship, whose children attend Indonesian national schools or Christian schools which follow an Indonesian-prescribed curriculum. The few Chinese private schools which remain "must include the Indonesian language as a subject of instruction . . ." and "... must follow the same general course of instruction [as the Indonesian national schools] and are subject to inspection by the Ministry of Education."⁹⁸ Furthermore, President Sukarno issued Presidential Decision No. 100 of the year 1960, effective on March 22 of that year, which restricted cultural missions from abroad in order to prevent the sort of foreign control of schools that had been exercised by such missions from China in the past: "The sending and receiving of cultural missions by the government are entrusted to the Department of Education and Culture, while the receiving of cultural missions by private parties requires official authorization" For all intents and purposes, the Indonesian Government now appears to have control over the education of its Chinese minority.

⁹⁷ *The Asian Recorder*, Vol. V, No. 18, loc. cit.

⁹⁸ *The Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960. p. 432.

IV. The Sociological Context of Overseas Chinese Education

Education and a Divided Chinese Community

The Chinese community in Indonesia, if it can be called such, had been internally rent by dissension stemming from loyalty to, and association with, differing places of origin in China. Such distinctions were reinforced by differences in dialects used in China, which tended to be perpetuated in the Indies. Newly arrived Chinese often settled in regions or parts of a city populated by persons from their home dialect groups, frequently relatives who were already Indies residents.¹ Further cleavage was based upon the differences in outlook of the *peranakan* and the *totok*—differences which were particularly evident after the rise of Chinese nationalism. Before the revolutionary movement in China, immigrants had felt little sense of identification with the disunified homeland. But Chinese who arrived subsequently did not fall as easily into the relatively apolitical pattern of *peranakan* society.

These differences were reflected in the schools which the Chinese associations began to open at the turn of the century, and which to some extent were reinforced by them. The associations which established schools were originally organized along regional lines. Before their schools were operated under the influence of reformists from China, the medium of instruction was often the dialect of the home community in China. Thus, area of origin differences were perpetuated through language. The THHK's purpose in organizing was to break down these divisions. Its chief means to this end was the opening of private Chinese schools, all of which would use the national language as the medium of instruction, thus facilitating cohesion through mutual intelligibility. The efforts of the THHK and other such organizations had considerable success in securing overseas Chinese abandonment of diverse dialects. However, the fact that upper socioeconomic class *peranakans* tended to select the Dutch-Chinese schools, whereas the *totoks* selected the private Chinese educational facilities,

¹ Palmer, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

indicates that education also served to drive a wedge between these two major segments of overseas Chinese society.

A distinctive feature of private Chinese education was that after the turn of the century it rapidly became a *totok* operation, and remained so until at least the 1950's. After 1900, the arrivals from the Chinese mainland had much less vested interest in local Dutch or Indonesian society than did the *peranakans*, many of whom were involved in business which cut through ethnic divisions, or were married to Indonesian wives. The *totoks* had not acquired the vision of Dutch language and customs as a stepping-stone to higher personal prestige. Furthermore, their recent experience in China intensified their interest in maintaining a continuing identification with their homeland. They maintained closer family relationships with people on the mainland. In short, they sought to create a Chinese environment in their adopted country. Therefore, a Chinese education for their children was considered paramount, especially in view of what the Dutch provided in the way of overseas Chinese education. It should be borne in mind that most *totoks* arrived in the Indies impoverished. Had they sought it, admission to "native schools" of the first class would have been unavailable to them and fees charged by any of the Dutch-Chinese schools would have been prohibitive. As their fortunes advanced, many *totoks* themselves became THHK organizers, favoring the Chinese nationalism emphasized in these schools.²

With regard to *peranakan-totok* divisions expressed through the Chinese schools, the Indonesian Government inherited a situation not unlike that faced by the Dutch. But there had been added the complication of a change in government on the Chinese mainland, followed by some shifts in local Chinese allegiances. The split between a pro-Chinese Communist orientation and a pro-Kuomintang orientation has tended to further reinforce *totok* versus *peranakan* conflict and to be expressed through the private Chinese schools.

Much of the older *totok* society with allegiance to the Chinese Nationalists, or Kuomintang, had become the new *peranakan* society. Still pro-Kuomintang, but with greater vested interest in their new homeland (following a second-generation pattern less politically oriented), these overseas Chinese tended to send their children to Christian missionary schools, Indonesian national schools, or private Chinese schools with pro-Kuomintang leanings.³ As evidence of their apolitical nature, Skinner observes that "Many *peranakans* . . . question the wisdom of teaching so much politics in the schools, and some feel quite strongly about Communist indoctrination of 10-year olds.

² Purcell, *The Chinese in Southeast Asia*, p. 532.

³ Willmott, *The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia*. 1956, p. 58.

Some [*peranakan*] newspapers have suggested government intervention and control."⁴

Despite widespread sympathy among the *peranakans* with the Kuomintang and earlier tendencies away from private Chinese education, and despite the fact that the majority of Chinese schools taught "the curriculum used in Communist China and . . . [were] . . . in large part staffed by China-born men who reportedly stress Communist indoctrination,"⁵ their children increasingly attended the Chinese schools during the 1950's.⁶ Willmott explains that some *peranakans*, in spite of their political sympathies, want their children to have a purely Chinese education, while others simply desire the best possible education for them, regardless of its political orientation.⁷ In either case, private Chinese education of whatever political coloration often appeared to be the only reasonable choice.

To generalize that overseas Chinese education was predominately pro-Communist in nature would be to ignore the fact that the Kuomintang had increasingly less opportunity for influencing the Chinese schools. One pro-Nationalist overseas Chinese leader was reported in 1959 to have complained:

Several years ago, we used to get about \$50 a month from Taipei [for the school], and even an occasional directive. But [now] our schools and newspapers would go bankrupt if it were not for personal contributions by a half-dozen men like myself. Worst of all, we haven't had a word from Formosa in almost four years.⁸

Even before the Indonesian Government singled out the pro-Nationalist schools for closure in 1957, there were difficulties for *peranakans* who wished a private Chinese education with pro-Kuomintang leanings for their children. Since the Indonesian Government maintained diplomatic relations with the Peking regime, the consular facilities of Communist China were available to the pro-Communist schools. Anti-Communist Chinese, however, were at a disadvantage in that the government in Taiwan was not officially recognized by Indonesia, and thus potential channels of support from that quarter were closed.

Like the Dutch, the Indonesian Government was disturbed over the factionalism within the Chinese community which expressed itself through the Chinese schools. No doubt the controversial political coloration of Chinese primary and secondary education was an additional inducement of the government in its desire to place all children, particularly those Chinese children whom they considered Indonesian

⁴ Skinner, *Report on the Chinese in Southeast Asia*, p. 67.

⁵ Thompson and Adloff, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

⁶ *Ibid.*; also see Skinner, "The Chinese of Java," p. 4.

⁷ Willmott, *The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia*, 1956, *loc. cit.*

⁸ Elegant, *op. cit.*, p. 237.

citizens, in national schools. Before launching an all-out campaign against private Chinese education, the government banned some curriculum materials and texts sent from China, on the grounds that the schools should be free from politics. The *Times of Indonesia* stated on May 26, 1952, in relation to government seizure of such materials, that "the authorities stressed that they would not tolerate communist cultural infiltration [in primary and secondary schools] where the twigs are easily bent."⁹ In 1952 and 1953, some Chinese schools in Java and Borneo were closed down for "disseminating political propaganda" and an Inspectorate of Foreign Schools was set up; one of its tasks was to arbitrate disputes between pro-Nationalist and pro-Peking Chinese regarding the use of Chinese school buildings.¹⁰

It is evident that the extent to which overseas Chinese sent their children to pro-Chinese Communist or pro-Kuomintang schools was not necessarily an indication of their own political sentiments. What does seem apparent is that, despite political factionalism within their community, many Chinese parents prefer that their children obtain some appreciation of Chinese culture, whether seen through Chinese Communist or pro-Kuomintang eyes. Just as the number of Chinese families who sent their children to Catholic or "Christian" (Protestant) schools failed to reflect in most cases the number of Christian Chinese homes,¹¹ so the number of Chinese who sent their children to Peking-oriented schools failed to provide a valid indicator of support for the Chinese Communist regime in the Indonesian Chinese community.

Nonetheless, the early *peranakan-totok* factionalism has been translated to some extent into pro-Kuomintang versus pro-Chinese Communist factionalism. But alignment according to original *peranakan-totok* divisions is to a great extent maintained. Despite the unifying effect of throwing all Chinese into the same schools under the Japanese occupation, the old differences reappeared, albeit in new guises.

Chinese Education and Indonesian Society

From early times, the Dutch practice of providing separate education for different classes and racial groups served to intensify Chinese-Indonesian separateness. The Dutch administration's lack of educational provision for the Chinese prior to 1908 inspired the appearance of private Chinese schools, which served to keep the Chinese apart from indigenous society. The Dutch-Chinese schools themselves segregated the Chinese students who attended from the indigenous

⁹ Thompson and Adloff, *loc. cit.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Palmier, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

people. One wonders if there is not a relationship between the fact that the lower socioeconomic class of Chinese attended the "native" schools, if they attended at all, and the fact that this very group was considered the most assimilated into indigenous society of all the overseas Chinese.¹² Dutch refusals to comply with Chinese requests for expanded educational facilities during the 1920's were justified on the grounds that such increased provisions would offend the Indonesians, yet the alternative of merging the Indonesian and Chinese schools into one was considered to be too expensive and impractical.¹³

The creation of private Chinese education served not only to intensify Indonesian-Chinese physical separateness, but also, inasmuch as a higher proportion of Chinese subsequently received schooling than did the indigenous people, to perpetuate the estrangement. In 1943, Raymond Kennedy, referring to the greater literacy of the Chinese as compared with the Indonesians, noted that over 50 percent of Chinese men and about 15 percent of Chinese women were able to read and write,¹⁴ or approximately 65 percent of Chinese adults. As late as 1947, in contrast, only 37 percent of the adult population of the Indies (including Chinese) were classified as "literate."¹⁵

Brian Harrison calls attention to the responsibility of education to unify the Indonesian peoples "in spirit", chiefly through teaching a common language. He alludes to the "disintegrating effects of education [where] wide ethnic as well as linguistic differences" occur, making particular reference to the independent Chinese schools as a serious "threat to integration."¹⁶ As was evidenced among the Chinese during the early 1900's, the widespread use of the Chinese national language in Chinese schools broke down internal divisions within the Chinese community occasioned by linguistic diversities. So, on the larger scale of integrating the entire Indonesian population, mutual intelligibility inspired through a common school system could be expected to produce greater interracial cohesion than has been evidenced in the past. Recognizing this need, the Indonesian Government insists that *bahasa Indonesia* (the Indonesian national language) be the medium of instruction in all national schools after the first 3 years,¹⁷ and that its study be included in the curriculum for a prescribed number of years at all "foreign" or private schools.¹⁸

¹² Skinner, "The Chinese of Java," *loc. cit.*

¹³ Purcell, *The Chinese in Southeast Asia*, p. 530.

¹⁴ Kennedy, *Islands and Peoples of the Indies*, p. 56.

¹⁵ S. L. van der Wal. *Some Information on Education in Indonesia up to 1942*. The Hague: Netherlands Universities Foundation for International Cooperation. 1960. p. 7.

¹⁶ Brian Harrison, "Problems of Political Integration in Southeast Asia," *Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956. p. 145.

¹⁷ Quoted from *Law No. 4, Concerning the Basis for School Education and Instruction*, 1950, Chapter IV, Article 5.

¹⁸ Willmott, *The Chinese of Semarang*, p. 176.

In his book, *Social Status and Power in Java*, Leslie Palmier explores the interrelationships which exist among various segments of the population in two Javanese communities during the mid-1950's. His discussion of the Catholic school there, which is attended by both Indonesians and Chinese, is particularly revealing with regard to the results of integrated Chinese-Indonesian education. He points out that while some friendships do evolve between Indonesian and Chinese children, they occur more easily among girls than boys, and generally do not carry over outside of school, except during the last 3 years of high school. Despite the implication that these friendships might continue into adult life, particularly since these students frequently shared the common religious faith of Catholicism, such did not appear to be the case. "There was no social intercourse between them [the Indonesians and Chinese] at all, and the only time they met was at church service. Such occasions were minimal, as they tended to attend services held at different times."¹⁹

Another example recorded by Palmier was that of the relationship between Indonesian and Chinese teachers who worked in the same state schools. One might expect a common profession to result in similarity of interests sufficient to provide a basis for social mingling. On the contrary, however, teacher relations were restricted to working hours. Palmier accounts for this by showing that interests outside their profession would be dissimilar. While the Indonesian might earn extra money tutoring on a part-time basis, the Chinese would be likely to engage in some business enterprise, like the production of batik. Probably the chances of a Chinese for advancement in a state school would be much less than those of his Indonesian counterpart. The children of the Chinese teacher would probably not have reason to aspire toward government service or responsible administrative positions outside of the Chinese business community. Both Chinese and Indonesian teachers are submerged within their own distinct racial and ethnic communities which have few interrelationships aside from purely business ones.²⁰

One might conclude from the foregoing discussions that integrated education can be expected to provide the prerequisite physical conditions under which assimilation can take place between overseas Chinese and the larger Indonesian society. But other conditions in society which make for greater overlapping of interests will be required to facilitate real unification "in spirit."

¹⁹ Palmier, *loc. cit.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 116-117.

Overseas Chinese Education and Mainland China

One of the distinctive features of the Chinese minority community in Indonesia, and throughout Southeast Asia for that matter, has been its historic relationship with mainland China. In recounting the ways in which Communist China has approached the problem of winning overseas Chinese to communism, Vandenbosch includes the following: international Communist meetings, the infiltration of labor unions, free Communist publications, radio broadcasts from China, and cultural and educational services.²¹ Upon closer examination, however, it appears that since the turn of the century, all Chinese governments have attempted to win political support of the overseas Chinese; and education has been utilized as perhaps the chief instrument of propaganda by Manchus, Nationalists, and Communists alike.

Aroused by the influence of exiled Chinese reformists in the development of private overseas Chinese schools, the Manchu Government dispatched emissaries and teachers to Southeast Asia and volunteered to bring overseas Chinese children to China for education at the secondary level.²² Meanwhile, the Chinese exiles and reformers who later took part in Sun Yat-sen's revolution and its aftermath were gaining support for the nationalist cause among the overseas Chinese.²³ By the time the Chinese revolution of 1911 was an accomplished fact, private Chinese education in Indonesia was geared to the new educational system then emerging in China, and was complete with nationalist Chinese teachers and curriculum materials. The influence of educators from the mainland dominated school boards and language instruction. The overseas Chinese, particularly *totoks*, were not only considerably unified in opposition to Dutch and Indonesians through educational means; they were also unified with a strong pro-China orientation. The institute in Nanking for the training of teachers for overseas Chinese schools, established under the Manchus,²⁴ was continued by the Nationalists. In 1927, the new Chinese Government, which established headquarters in Nanking under Chiang Kai-shek, stepped up its influence upon Chinese education abroad by insisting that these schools register with the Chinese Ministry of Education. The Ministry supplied teachers and sent educational inspectors; the latter would come disguised as travelers and businessmen when Dutch administrative action prohibited their free movement.²⁵

During the period of Japanese occupation of Indonesia in World War II, overseas Chinese were conditioned to a considerable extent for

²¹ Vandenbosch, "Chinese Thrust Into Southeast Asia" p. 337.

²² Willmott, *The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia*, 1958, p. 4.

²³ Purcell, *The Chinese in Southeast Asia*. loc. cit.

²⁴ Meijer, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

the Communist victory on the mainland which was to take place in 1949. Communists, often arriving by way of Malaya, were active under the occupation as the only organized group over which the Japanese were able to exert little control. By the end of the war, as Kuomintang supporters went back into business, the Communists were able to "elicit the enthusiasm and dedication" of their Party members in filling the vacancies occasioned by a severe teacher shortage in private Chinese schools.²⁶ Their willingness to take the low-paying teaching positions contributed to the rapid expansion of these schools.²⁷ Piotrow stated in 1958 that, "Communist agents appear to have captured the Chinese school system" by installing their own teachers, enrolling Communists as students to organize youth groups, sending pamphlets, books, and exhibits, and appealing to Chinese students to go to China for higher education.²⁸ These means employed by the Chinese Communists to control overseas Chinese education did not appear to be very different from those used by their mainland predecessors.

Prior to the 1911 revolution in China, teachers dispatched to the Nanyang were usually of inferior quality. While reformists and the teachers who arrived subsequently were probably better qualified, they were so imbued with whatever Chinese political views were currently dominant on the mainland that education other than political indoctrination was frequently neglected. As a result, educational standards in the Nanyang schools were always considered to be lower than on the Chinese mainland.²⁹ In 1948, many Chinese teachers in Indonesia joined the "leftist" *Nan Hwa* [South China] Education Association,³⁰ and in 1950, Skinner described most teachers in the Chinese schools as "China-born, young and pro-Peking."³¹

Curriculum materials used in these overseas Chinese schools have frequently come directly from China. Through this means, the changing Chinese governments, whatever their political philosophy, have not only exerted a control over the content of curriculum but have also abetted the maintenance of Chinese separateness through the use of the Chinese language in these materials. During the 1950's, the local associations which sponsored Chinese schools were unable to afford translations of these texts into Indonesian, even if they had wanted them.³² During this period, the supply of texts from sources

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

²⁷ Pye, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

²⁸ Piotrow, *op. cit.*, p. 799.

²⁹ Elegant, *op. cit.*, p. 137-193.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 236.

³¹ Skinner, *Report on the Chinese in Southeast Asia*, p. 66.

³² *Ibid.*

other than Communist China was inadequate.³³ Even prior to Communist control of the Chinese mainland, the Dutch authorities had frequently banned imported Chinese texts, which were known to sometimes discredit the Southeast Asian governments in power.³⁴ Current events courses were taught by pro-Chinese Communist teachers in these schools by using as source materials, without the knowledge of the schools' management committees, the Communist-oriented publications, *Sheng-huo Pao* and *Sin Po*.³⁵

Shortly after the turn of the century, the Manchu Government invited Chinese THHKK school graduates to attend *Chi Nan Hsueh T'ang*, a government school in Nanking, for secondary schooling at the expense of the Imperial Government.³⁶ This invitation was followed by a long series of such appeals by subsequent Chinese governments, continuing after the establishment of the Chinese Communist regime. For example, one important duty of the Commission of Overseas Chinese Affairs, established in 1949 in Peking, was to "give assistance to overseas students seeking higher education by finding quarters for them, obtaining preferential treatment from the Department of Culture and Education, and recommending them to appropriate institutions."³⁷ Thompson and Adloff reported in 1955 that more Chinese from Indonesia than from any other country had responded to Peking's invitation for higher education, some 5,000 coming from Indonesia in 1953 alone. They accounted for this fact by pointing to the "almost unhampered propaganda activities of the Communist Chinese diplomats among Chinese school children"³⁸ which existed in Indonesia prior to that time.

Other sources later suggested that the overcrowding in Chinese universities and the "independent-minded" quality of overseas Chinese students³⁹ were responsible for a reduction of the stream of students going to China for education to a "mere trickle" by 1959.⁴⁰ Piotrow actually cites a decline in the number of students returning to mainland China as early as 1957.⁴¹ This could suggest that the hardening of the official Indonesian Government position on students attending Chinese institutions of higher learning was instrumental in inducing fewer students to go abroad. The fact that the curriculum

³³ Pye, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

³⁴ Meljer, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

³⁵ Elegant, *op. cit.*, p. 236.

³⁶ Willmott, *The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia, 1956*, *loc. cit.*

³⁷ Skinner, *Report on the Chinese in Southeast Asia*, p. 81.

³⁸ Thompson and Adloff, *op. cit.*, p. 49-50.

³⁹ Piotrow, *loc. cit.*

⁴⁰ C. M. Chen, "The Chinese in Southeast Asia," *Free China Review*, Vol. IX (December, 1959), p. 18.

⁴¹ Piotrow, *loc. cit.*

in the Chinese private schools prior to 1957 was geared to higher learning in China or Taiwan, and that the same matriculation examinations were given to these overseas Chinese students as were given in China,⁴² served as inducements for students to continue their education on the mainland. But as a result of the educational changes brought about by the transfer into state schools of students who were Indonesian nationals, and the closer supervision of private schools, graduates are no longer adequately prepared for Chinese higher education.

Schools and Chinese Political Factionalism

As the Manchus and reformists competed for the support of the overseas Chinese half a century before, the Nationalists and Communists competed in the decade of the 1950's. Meijer claims that after World War II, the pro-Kuomintang associations had control of primary education in Djakarta, but the Communists gained control of the high schools, control which they retained until the late 1950's.⁴³ Since the primarily pro-Chinese Communist *totoks* predominated in private Chinese education despite the increase in *peranakan* enrollments, the pro-Chinese Communist nature of the majority of overseas Chinese independent schools was "tolerated" by most parents.⁴⁴ Pro-Nationalist education was made available to an estimated one-third of students attending independent Chinese schools just prior to government seizure; however, there was no doubt that the Kuomintang influence was weakening.⁴⁵

Despite the fact that virtually all of the Chinese schools between 1950 and 1957 were staffed and often managed by political factions representing Peking or Taipei loyalties, ". . . it [was] undoubtedly true that the pupils of the various schools [were] much less partisan nationally, religiously, and politically than . . . [were] the respective school staffs," the majority being probably apolitical.⁴⁶ There were cases of parents who actually opposed the political view held by the school staff, but nevertheless sent their children to the school to get what they considered the best education available, or an education of value because of its Chinese character, regardless of political color.⁴⁷ One must conclude from the foregoing that, to the majority of adult overseas Chinese, political considerations have not been among the most important criteria in the selection of a school for their children. Many adult Chinese in Indonesia may have taken pride in being somehow related to the growing international influence of mainland

⁴² Willmott, *The Chinese of Semarang*, loc. cit.

⁴³ Meijer, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

⁴⁴ Skinner, *Report on the Chinese in Southeast Asia*, p. 66.

⁴⁵ Elegant, *op. cit.*, p. 237.

⁴⁶ Willmott, *The Chinese of Semarang*, p. 174.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

China, or loyal to the old glories of the Nationalists. But more often than not, their own economic position in Indonesia remained their major concern in spite of such associations or identifications with the motherland.

Several sources distinguish between overseas Chinese adult and youth attitudes toward the competition between pro-Communist China and pro-Nationalist elements. The Communists have directed most of their appeals in the Chinese community toward the young people, and it is among these youths that the ideology of Peking enjoys greatest success. Lucian Pye refers to the interest evoked among overseas Chinese youth by whatever "fads" are popular on the Chinese mainland,⁴⁸ and Meijer describes the way in which boys and girls in their early teens were encouraged by pro-Chinese Communist leadership: ". . . students could always find a [pro-Communist newspaper] to denounce the Kuomintang and voice their nonsensical views on politics . . . it is great to be taken seriously when you're 13 or 14."⁴⁹ In spite of the fact that the pro-Chinese Communist activities of many overseas Chinese youth appeared to be a far cry from doctrinaire Communism, a greater leaning toward Peking appeared evident among young people than among their elders. Further substantiation of the pro-Peking leanings of Chinese young people is indicated by a 1955 survey among overseas Chinese students. It disclosed that at least two-thirds of all the respondents claimed Chinese citizenship, as opposed to "stateless person" status (the only acceptable alternative for Kuomintang-Taiwan adherents) or Indonesian citizenship.⁵⁰

Both the Dutch and Indonesian administrations have found the presence of Chinese schools, always closely associated with political influences from China or Taiwan, to be a disturbing problem. After the turn of the century, Dutch authorities sporadically deported teachers considered to be political subversives, seized Chinese texts, closed schools temporarily, and refused entry to education officials and inspectors from abroad. In the early years of the 1950's the Indonesian Government did little in instituting such measures. In 1952, as noted heretofore, it began to reactivate sanctions against the Chinese schools, but these sanctions were not vigorously enforced, as a result of pressure from Peking diplomatic sources and lack of sufficient funds to provide universal education for even the indigenous population. Restrictive measures were accelerated beginning in 1957 and were strictly implemented in the final years of the decade.

As a part of the general drive against pro-Kuomintang and, later, pro-Communist Chinese, the Indonesian Government had closed most

⁴⁸ Pye, *loc. cit.*

⁴⁹ Meijer, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

⁵⁰ Willmott, *The Chinese of Semarang, op. cit.*, p. 175-176.

of the private schools of both by the end of the 1950's. In those schools which remained, it was insisting upon stricter curriculum requirements and was requiring teachers to meet government-specified qualifications. In view of the historically wavering policies of successive governing authorities in the Indies regarding Chinese education, and the potential pressures that may be brought to bear by Communist China, one wonders to what extent the Indonesian Government may be able to maintain its present degree of control over Chinese schools.

V. Summary and Conclusions

Separate privately supported Chinese education in Indonesia has performed the political function of intensifying Chinese separateness, and, thus, retarding assimilation into the larger Indonesian society. In addition, private Chinese education has contributed importantly to the cohesion of that minority community. Education was the chief means by which the Chinese businessmen's organizations sought to dissolve regional and linguistic differences which alienated factions of the Chinese community. Through the use of a uniform language of instruction, Chinese curriculum materials, and a common interest in Chinese politics and culture, the Chinese schools had great success in reducing overseas Chinese differences.

There can be no doubt that the Chinese community emerged from a state of extreme division into one of relative cohesion as a result of its private educational system. However, it must be admitted that education was also instrumental in reinforcing an underlying division in that community, that which existed between *totoks* and *peranakans*. This difference was manifest in the fact that *totoks* were more intimately related to the private Chinese schools, and, correspondingly, were less well assimilated into the larger Indonesian community. *Peranakans* were more willing to utilize non-Chinese educational institutions; they have been more inclined toward assimilation than the *totoks*. The pro-Chinese Communist versus pro-Kuomintang nature of private Chinese education during the 1950's tended to further divide the Chinese community. To some extent, this division also reflected *totok-peranakan* differences, the former being more pro-Chinese Communist, the latter more apolitical or pro-Kuomintang. Looking into the future, a new division of the Chinese community may be predicted—a division arising from the placing of Indonesian citizens of Chinese origin in the national schools, while those of stateless person status or of Communist Chinese citizenship may continue to attend privately supported Chinese schools. *Peranakan-totok* differences are again implied, however, since those who claim Chinese citizenship are usually *totoks*.

Since the rise of mainland Chinese nationalism, all Chinese governments, whether Manchu, Nationalist, or Communist, have attempted to win support of the overseas Chinese through manipulation of the private Chinese schools. All have done so with considerable success arising primarily from two factors: (1) The isolation of the overseas Chinese community within the foreign country produces a receptiveness toward overtures from the Chinese mainland, and, to a lesser extent, from Taiwan; (2) because of ambivalence on the part of Dutch or Indonesian administrations before the late 1950's, policies to limit and control mainland China's influence have been only sporadically established or enforced. The manner in which these Chinese governments have elicited overseas Chinese support through educational means has varied only in intensity. If the Communists have appeared to exert greater educational pressure than past governments, it must be attributed to their greater means and will to advance such programs. All of these Chinese governments have dispatched teachers and inspectors to staff and supervise these schools; all have exerted further control over curriculum by supplying most of the textbooks and teaching materials used; all have offered higher education in China to graduates of the private overseas Chinese schools.

Despite the political purposes of China's overtures, the nature of overseas Chinese loyalties to China has not been strongly political. Many Chinese parents sought Chinese education for their children on nonpolitical grounds, believing that Chinese private schools have historically offered a higher standard of instruction than have their Dutch or Indonesian counterparts which were available to the Chinese. These schools held the promise of providing a background of Chinese culture and language, both of which have been highly prized by many overseas Chinese. Furthermore, the Chinese schools included in their curriculum the kinds of studies which would prepare students for work in the trades, where they would likely be engaged as adults. However, it must be acknowledged that the political appeals made by Communist China or Taiwan through the private Chinese schools during the 1950's appeared to have a more considerable effect upon overseas Chinese youth than upon their parents.

Dutch and Indonesian policies and practices have not induced the majority of overseas Chinese to accept the provisions made for their education in the Indies. To the previously cited factors, must be added the lack of identification of the overseas Chinese with the larger Indonesian society. This may be attributed to both the Chinese desire for separateness and Indonesian or Dutch unwillingness to provide sufficient incentive for Chinese assimilation. The upwardly

mobile characteristic of the overseas Chinese was not facilitated within the larger society, certainly not by the Dutch or Indonesian schools. Those Dutch schools which the Chinese considered to be of acceptable standard trained students for positions in the governmental administrative structure, although this professional area was closed to them. Furthermore, there appears insufficient evidence to indicate that the Dutch or Indonesians really desired assimilation of the Chinese. But both have desired to control their troublesome Chinese minority, a control which has been made more difficult by the influence of the private Chinese schools. That those who have opted for Indonesian citizenship have been placed in Indonesian national schools does not necessarily provide evidence that the government desires Chinese assimilation. However, incorporation of Chinese students into government schools removes the threat to government control once arising from privately administered Chinese education.

Most Indonesian students of Chinese origin are attending national schools. The results are likely to be favorable to a certain amount of breakdown in the separateness of these Chinese and the Indonesian population generally. First, it is to be remembered that these are the Chinese who opted for Indonesian citizenship, indicating their greater propensity for assimilation than those who sought Communist Chinese citizenship. Secondly, the daily contact and common frame of reference afforded by a common curriculum and language medium provides an indispensable basis for, although it does not guarantee, assimilation. Finally, the placing of students in a standardized curriculum which prepares them for higher education in Indonesia, not Communist or Nationalist China, is an inducement to remain within that framework.

The present precarious status of private Chinese education in Indonesia may be subject to change. For one thing, it arose out of the Dual Nationality Treaty with Communist China which is itself subject to change. Since the Treaty might fail to allow the Indonesian Government the extent of control of its Chinese "aliens" which it desires, greater control of the private schools or their total abolishment could occur in a certain political atmosphere. On the other hand, the influence and number of these schools might grow if there is an expansion of the power of Communist China. Insofar as the agreement with Indonesia to refrain from interference with Indonesian nationals of Chinese origin is concerned, a glance at the history of such agreements involving China indicates that they are frequently ignored. A China in need of Indonesia's "neutralist" support—as it was from 1955 to 1960, when it finally withdrew its claim to protect all overseas Chinese in Indonesia—is one thing; but quite a different view of the overseas

Chinese question might be taken by the Communist Chinese leadership at some point in the future if the power and prestige of their regime were fully consolidated. In the meantime, Chinese diplomatic presence in the country is maintained. At any time when the Indonesian Government is considered vulnerable on the issue or when China considers herself to be in a position of sufficient strength, the Chinese Communist regime may reassert its claim to represent the useful overseas Chinese. At such a time, teachers and curriculum materials from China would be rapidly forthcoming for overseas Chinese schools as in the past.

It seems clear that the old criticisms made by the Dutch and reiterated by the Indonesian Government—that the curriculum of the private Chinese schools failed to fit their students for life in the Indies—is the best justification for their discontinuance. Yet it is also apparent that political conditions, which to a great extent produced and maintained these schools, were responsible for their closure. Conceived in Chinese nationalism, these schools were brought to their eventual downfall by their confrontation with the Indonesian Government's attempt to nurture a nationalism of its own.

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